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Abstract 
Why do attempts at social and political inclusion result in exclusion? On the basis of this 
empirical puzzle the thesis sets out to investigate the politics of inclusion and exclusion in 
democratizing Nepal. In 2006, Nepal’s Maoist party went from armed insurgency to 
resuming parliamentary politics and rapidly became the leading actor on the political scene, 
challenging the historical domination by the centrist/right-wing parties. This signaled the 
beginning of a new phase in the democratization process. From a citizenship perspective, this 
thesis analyzes how political parties have related to the issue of political and social inclusion 
since democracy was restored in 1990 and until 2012. This thesis finds that despite efforts 
toward inclusion, policies remain exclusionary. Through the analytical framework of popular 
mobilization, the political parties’ strategies of mobilization and organization are examined in 
order to explain the lack of inclusionary policies. The analysis reveals that since the Maoist 
party resumed electoral politics the agenda of socio-economic inclusion has been secondary 
to a focus on specific rights of the various subgroups that constitute their political base. The 
main conclusion of this study is that attempts to promote inclusionary politics have failed due 
to the fragmented political community. 	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“People talk about inclusive democracy. I don’t understand that. Either 
democracy is inclusive or it is not democracy” (NGO employee, Kathmandu).  
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1 Introduction 
When Nepal’s Maoist party won the 2008 Constituent Assembly election in a landslide 
victory, popular aspirations were high for an imminent change in the political and socio-
economic development in the country. In the context of recovery after a decade-long armed 
conflict (1996-2006) rooted in the high level of economic and social inequality, the peace and 
democratization process in Nepal saw the light of new hope. The rights of marginalized 
groups came to the center of political debates. When the term of the Constituent Assembly 
expired in 2012, little had changed with regard to anticipated socio-economic improvements. 
Observations rather indicated a drawback to exclusionary politics. This thesis aims at the 
exploration and explanation of this empirical puzzle: why did efforts toward inclusion result 
in exclusion? 
 
1.1 The empirical puzzle 
Nepal is struggling with extreme levels of inequality. Particularly high are levels of 
inequality between groups and between regions within the country. The coming to power of a 
communist party witnessed broad support for the Maoist agenda of inclusion and equality. 
The Maoists, representing a new radical force on the political scene, challenged the historic 
dominance by the traditional right-wing/centrist parties of the Nepali Congress and the 
Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist.  
 
In culturally and ethnically diverse Nepal, previous attempts at democratization have resulted 
in elite-led processes, perpetuating exclusion and marginalization, serving the purpose of 
affirming the position of the elite rather than increasing popular participation. It is true that 
recent years’ political development in Nepal bears signs of important steps forward in the 
process of democratization. The 2008 election of a Constituent Assembly with the mandate to 
draft the country’s new constitution is a case in point. The Constituent Assembly has been 
celebrated as the country’s most representative institution. Drafting a new constitution by a 
democratically elected constituent assembly had been a longstanding issue on the agenda of 
Nepal’s Maoist party. The Maoists have mobilized on the basis of ethnic grievances toward 
the state since they first launched the insurgency in 1996, and have been the prime force to 
raise the issues of marginalized groups, advocating inclusion and the right to political self-
determination. However, from the 1990s until today we have seen increasing identity politics 
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with the establishment of a number of ethnic-based parties and movements. A central actor in 
this regard is the Madhesi movement. The movement started in 2007 as a broad coalition of 
civil society organizations taking to the streets to advocate for the inclusion and rights of the 
Madhesi population of the Tarai region in south Nepal. One of the central organizations that 
took part in the uprising, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal registered a few months later 
as a political party and became the 4th largest party in the Constituent Assembly election in 
2008. In short, the democratization process in Nepal has seen significant steps forward in 
terms of increasing political mobilization of historically excluded groups. However, the 
development of rising identity politics is a matter of widespread concern, as a threat to the 
process of democratization and peace. 
 
The Maoists took the mainstream political parties by surprise in the election for the 
Constituent Assembly in 2008, winning 220 out of 575 elected seats, followed by Nepali 
Congress (110 seats), Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (103 seats) and 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal (52 seats). To go from armed insurgency to resuming 
parliamentary democracy in 2006 marked a new phase and strategy of the Maoists in the 
project of transforming the Nepali state. An interim constitution was promulgated in 2007, 
defining the aim of restructuring the Nepali state into an inclusive, federal democratic 
republic. A federal state structure is among marginalized groups seen as the solution to the 
deeply rooted problems of historical exclusion and domination by the high hill Hindu caste. 
However, in spite of their advantageous electoral position, the Maoist party has proved 
unable to translate the agenda of inclusion into substantive output. Political representation has 
seen improvements, but there has been an absence of implementation of pro-poor policies. 
When the Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 2012 without having agreed on a draft 
constitution, the Maoists came out of it as the prime actor responsible for the failure to 
produce a draft constitution. Moreover, the Maoists have failed to bring about a change in the 
socio-economic and cultural sphere, in spite of it historically having been a top priority on 
their agenda. One telling example is the lack of land reform. Further, the state apparatus has 
remained controlled by a confined group of people. Party ideology and cleavages within and 
between parties proved difficult to overcome, and the unwillingness to compromise led to a 
political deadlock in the constitutional negotiations. Additionally, the process itself in the 
Constituent Assembly has been characterized by a lack of democratic control and procedures, 
reminding of previous patterns of political exclusion, rather than making use of the potential 
and legitimacy of a broadly representative institution. Toward the end of the process it 
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became more evident that an exclusive elite was in the driving seat, more concerned with 
securing their own interests than delivering on their promises of an inclusive and equal 
society. Decisions were made in secret among the top leadership (ICG 2012a, 6). Critical 
evaluations highlight the exclusionary politics as a result of the Maoist performance in 
government (see Shrestha 2014; ICG 2010):  
The people are close to breaking point, betrayed by politicians who promised 
the paradise of New Nepal but have delivered only dysfunction and disorder 
(…) The state has retreated and delivers neither public security nor public 
goods (…) The root causes of the Maoist insurgency have barely been 
addressed, redress for past wrongs are has been minimal and steps to guard 
against repetition only tentative. (ICG 2010, 1-2) 
 
It may seem as though the Maoists have lost out on their opportunity to transform the Nepali 
society with the broad popular mandate given to them.  
 
Why is it that attempts at inclusion have lead to exclusion? The empirical puzzle deserves 
attention. One of the major challenges for substantial democratization in the Global South 
relates to problems of flawed popular representation (Törnquist, Webster, and Stokke 2009). 
Many people are incorporated rather than integrated into politics, leaving power and 
influence to rest with a small elite (Mouzelis 1998). Democracy requests political and social 
inclusion, which, given the recent developments in Nepal, raises some questions regarding 
the prospects of further democratization in the country. This thesis aims to take a closer look 
into the dynamics of political inclusion and exclusion in Nepal in order to elaborate on the 
prospects of substantial democratization.   
 
1.2 Research question and scope of the thesis 
The Maoist and the Madhesi movements have put inclusion firmly on the political agenda, 
but it seems they have proved unable or unwilling to translate this into substantive outcome. 
The traditional political parties, the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified 
Marxist Leninist, who have been seen as high-caste centered, have on their side adapted to a 
more competitive political arena and an electorate raising a broader range of issues. Thus, 
neither of their agendas have gone unaffected in this changing political setting. It is on this 
basis I set out to discover the dynamics behind the politics of inclusion and exclusion in 
Nepal. In the process of democratization and state building – how do the politics of 
citizenship develop and change in accordance with a changing political scene? As all the 
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actors agree to work within the framework of democracy, what are their options and 
strategies to mobilize the electorate on an increasingly competitive political arena? On the 
basis of the empirical puzzle, the feasible research question in this thesis is:  
 
What have been the positions of the political parties in Nepal to the issue of political and 
social inclusion over time and how may this be explained?  
 
The empirical puzzle arises from the observation of political developments and the relative 
lack of substantive outcome in terms of inclusionary policies in Nepal since peace was 
restored in 2006 and until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 2012. This paper 
will therefore focus on the actors that have dominated the political scene in Nepal during this 
period. This includes the analysis of the strategies and agendas of the two political parties 
that traditionally have dominated the political scene since democracy was restored in 1990: 
the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist 
(hereafter: UML). In the election for the Constituent Assembly in 2008 these parties came 
second and third, respectively. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN(M)) 
is an obvious actor that needs to be included in the study, given the party’s prominent 
position in Nepali politics both in setting the political agenda as well as for winning the 
Constituent Assembly election in 2008. Furthermore, I include in the study the Madhesi 
movement and the political party Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal (MJF) (in English: 
People’s Rights Movement, Nepal) that was established in the aftermath of the movement, 
given the party’s central role in the Constituent Assembly, as well as the Madhesi 
movements’ crucial role in setting the political agenda prior to this.  
  
The period between 2006-2008 represents a crucial shift in the Nepali political scene, with 
the end of the armed insurgency and the entrance of new forces on the electoral arena 
challenging the previous domination of the NC and UML. Especially interesting is the Maoist 
transition in going from armed insurgency to working within the framework of a multiparty 
democracy. The agenda was set for transforming the Nepali state into an inclusive republic 
state. The empirical puzzle suggests that there has been a change in terms of attempts at 
fostering inclusionary politics after 2006 relative to the actors’ prior agendas. Due to the 
limited scope of this thesis, some time restrictions are needed when setting out to identify 
such changes. The current process of fostering political inclusion is closely related to the 
restructuring of the state and the writing of the new constitution. In analyzing the political 
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parties’ positions on the contested issues relating to political and social inclusion today, and 
any changes relative to their prior agendas, I will center the comparison to their previous 
positions and agendas during the period from the restoration of liberties and electoral 
democracy in 1990 until 1996 when the Maoists launched their insurgency. 
 
1.3 Literature review 
The concept of popular participation is closely related to democracy and democratization. 
Democracy can be defined as “popular control of public affairs on the basis of political 
equality” (Beetham 1999 in Törnquist 2013, 1). Democratization is the process in which the 
aims and values of democracy are further extended to either include more citizens previously 
excluded or political institutions that were previously not under public control (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, 8). It is a continuous process which requires “the authentic political 
inclusion of different groups and categories, for which formal political equality can hide 
continued exclusion and oppression” (Dryzek 1996, 475, cited in Lawoti 2007c, 58). Political 
inclusion thus means effective and equal participation of different groups in the governance 
of public affairs. 
 
The role of popular participation in processes of democratization is debated in the academic 
literature. The liberal discourse focuses on the importance of civil and political liberties and 
popular participation in the form of free and fair elections. The wave of democratic 
transitions that swept the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s was underpinned by the 
liberal, procedural understanding of democracy. The dominating idea was that liberal 
institutions could be crafted on the basis of pacts between moderate elites (Törnquist 2013, 
7). With a legal framework and liberal democratic institutions in place, such as free and fair 
elections, rule of law, human rights and civil society organizations, the assumption was that 
the local actors within the countries would adhere to the rules of the game and thus become 
democrats (ibid., 8). Since the 1990s, the international community has also seen the building 
of liberal political and economic institutions as a recipe for resolving conflict (Stokke 2011, 
323). The liberal peace agenda builds on an understanding of peace and democracy as 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing: “(…) liberal democracy and neo-liberal development 
are mutually reinforcing and will accommodate identity- and interest-based grievances, 
thereby building and consolidating peace” (Kotzé 2010 in Stokke 2011, 328).  
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While the neoliberal peace agenda swears by the positive impact of liberal institutions in 
hindering potential internal conflicts, other scholars warn against the introduction of some of 
these institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2007) argue that popular participation should not be 
the top priority in democratic transitions, and especially not in multicultural contexts. The 
institutional framework needs to be in place before holding elections, as impartial and 
competent state institutions are crucial for a functioning democracy (ibid., 7). The argument 
is such that without the institutional preconditions in place, loyalties based on ethnicity or 
religion for example, will be difficult to overcome, and rather, would become the basis of 
political participation. In such cases, Mansfield and Snyder argue, contrary to the liberal 
argument that democracy fosters peace and vice versa, it may lead to ethnic conflict (ibid., 7). 
Drawing on examples from what they regard as premature popular participation in among 
others Iraq and Lebanon, they warn that “cases where failed attempts at mass electoral 
politics left a legacy of ethnic nationalism, military populism, and few useable democratic 
institutions.” (ibid., 8) The answer thus lies in ‘sequencing’ democracy. That is to first build 
the institutions, with a focus on the rule of law and good governance, and once these have 
‘taken root’ in the society the poplar masses can be involved in politics through democratic 
elections (ibid., 6).  
 
Törnquist, Webster, and Stokke (2009) disagree with the argument of postponing democracy 
in order to first build political stability. Rather than postponing popular participation focus 
must be on improving the linkages between the people and the representatives. The scholars 
argue that the problem in recent democratic transitions in developing countries is not only 
that the institutional framework is not strong enough, but that democracy has been 
depoliticized. The depoliticization is due to poor democratic representation that makes it 
difficult to hold the representative accountable and fragmentation of the masses hinders 
collective action (Törnquist 2009). The root of the problem is that the liberal democratic 
paradigm promotes a one-size-fits-all model of parachuting down supposedly universal 
liberal democratic institutions, whereas contextual factors and power relations are not taken 
into consideration (ibid.). The assumption that the actors would automatically adhere to the 
new rules and institutions has proved wrong, as powerful elites have adapted the institutions 
to their own interests and ideas, and democracy remains a rather shallow cover (Harriss, 
Stokke, and Törnquist 2004).  
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These dominating discourses build on two different understandings of democracy. The 
liberals, and those in favor of sequencing democracy, adhere to a procedural definition of 
democracy with its focus on institutions such as free and fair elections and rule of law. The 
dissidents subscribe instead to a substantive definition of democracy that first identifies the 
aims, to thereafter analyze to what extent the institutions actually foster these aims and make 
possible the equal exercise of citizenship rights. One does not take for granted that various 
institutions are democratic, which is an empirical issue (Törnquist 2013, 14). According to 
the critics, democracy requires both popular participation and state institutions. 
 
The empirical puzzle that I focus on in this study is why efforts toward inclusion have 
resulted in exclusion. According to the liberal peace theory, liberal democracy fosters peace 
because it accommodates different interests and identities in the society. The ‘sequencing’ of 
democracy theory, on the other hand, argues that identity-conflicts increase with premature 
attempts at democracy, that is, before the necessary institutions are in place. The 
developments in Nepal in the aftermath of the restoration of democracy in 1990 give support 
to the second thesis. The Maoist-launched insurgency was indeed a result of the failure of 
liberal democracy to accommodate ethnic and identity-based grievances. But Mansfield and 
Snyder (2007) also argue that such failed attempts at democratization leave a negative legacy 
for later attempts at democratization and leads to more violent transitions. The developments 
in 2007, when the Tarai region saw a violent uprising in the Madhesi movement, to some 
extent give support to this argument too1. However, the conflict within short time calmed 
down, and although identity politics is still prominent in Nepal, the at times fragile peace has 
been sustained. Both theories are thus insufficient in explaining the empirical puzzle that 
haunts democratization in Nepal; that demands and policies of inclusion have resulted in 
exclusion. The third dominating perspective suggests that the problem of democratization is 
depoliticization, and that contextual factors and power relations impact the institutions. 
According to Törnquist, Webster, and Stokke (2009), democratization requests both popular 
participation and state institutions for policy-making. I find the position of the critics most 
convincing and will pay special attention to the role of citizenship. Citizenship is the 
institution through which people can claim their right to participate in public governance, 
access decision-making arenas and influence the control and use of public resources. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 During the Madhesi uprising in January-February 2007 there was a series of violent demonstrations, 
kidnappings and killings, claiming more than 100 lives (Dahal 2010). 
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Democratic institutions, on the other hand, requests popular legitimacy and representation 
(Grugel 2002). Citizenship and democratization are in other words inevitably interlinked. I 
will elaborate more on citizenship in chapter 2, which provides the theoretical framework for 
this study. 
 
In line with the liberal notion of democracy, studies on democratization have tended to focus 
on the creation of institutions; the writing of constitutions and the establishment of electoral 
systems. Focus has been on the role of the state in the economy, models of political 
participation and the rule of law (Grugel 2002, Butenschon 2000).  
 
Likewise, recent studies on democratization in Nepal have largely revolved around the same 
topics2. The issue of political representation of marginalized groups has been widely 
discussed in studies on the constitution-writing process as well as in state institutions in 
general (see Lawoti 2007c, 2012; Slavu 2012). While these studies mainly concern the 
technical aspects of representation and electoral systems, they do not delve any further into 
the role of political actors’ in fostering policies of inclusion or exclusion. 
 
Several studies on popular participation and political inclusion in Nepal relate to the recent 
decades of ‘ethnicization’ of politics and identity movements. These include a wide range of 
studies on the Maoist insurgency (Hutt 2004a; Thapa 2002; Thapa and Sijapati 2004). There 
is also a vast literature of anthropological studies on other ethnic movements across Nepal 
(Hangen 2010; Gellner 2008; Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka, and Whelpton 1997) and on Madhesi 
activism and the uprising in 2007 (Hachhethu 2007a; Hatlebakk 2007). Popular participation 
and political inclusion and exclusion have thus been raised from different perspectives in the 
literature on Nepal, and the Maoists’ and the Madhesis’ claims for inclusion have been 
thoroughly discussed. Research so far has concluded that inclusion remains to be achieved in 
a context of rising identity politics. In my view, these findings need to be supplemented with 
contributions from yet another perspective, i.e. by investigating the role of political parties in 
fostering or hindering political and social inclusion from a citizenship perspective. Existing 
literature rarely provides in-depth analyses of why the efforts at creating inclusionary politics 
in Nepal have failed. This is where this paper aims to make a contribution.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As a non-Nepali reader I am only able to take into account academic literature written in English.  
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Recent studies of the political parties concern their role in the peace process and in the 
constitution-making process, whereas previous works treat their role after democracy was 
restored in 1990 and during the Maoist insurgency. Hachhethu (2003), Hutt (1991, 1994) 
Dhungel (2007a) and Hoftun, Whelpton and Raeper (2007) have given detailed accounts on 
the structure, ideology and politics of the political parties in the 1990s and 2000s. While these 
studies on the political parties in Nepal treat their role in various phases of the 
democratization process, there are no comprehensive studies on how they may have changed 
over time, taking into consideration the altering political conditions in the aftermath of 2006. 
I draw on the existing literature to examine how the parties related to the issue of political 
and social inclusion when democracy was restored in the 1990, and then proceed with an 
analysis of whether and how there have been any changes in the second phase of the 
democratization process. Analyzing the positions of the political parties to the issue of 
political and social inclusion over time can provide explanations that may have a bearing on 
the empirical puzzle of why efforts toward inclusion have resulted in exclusion. 
 
1.4 Approach to the study 
I have a twofold approach to the research question about what have been the positions of the 
political parties in Nepal to the issue of political and social inclusion over time and how may 
this be explained.  First, I will elaborate on the empirical puzzle through the study of the 
politics of citizenship. Applying a citizenship approach to Nepali politics allows the analysis 
of politics of inclusion and exclusion. Second, I seek to provide an explanation to the 
empirical puzzle by utilizing a framework of popular mobilization that sheds light on three 
important aspects in efforts at creating inclusionary politics. I shall return to the details. 
 
The thesis is both descriptive and analytical. It first elaborates on the content of citizenship 
policies and conflicts around citizenship in order to describe the political parties’ positions to 
the issue of political and social inclusion over time, before it turns to the analysis of what 
may explain this. The paper first and foremost aims at providing an explanation to the 
specific empirical puzzle present in Nepal. In the larger context, it also aims at contributing to 
the broader dialogue on challenges to social and political inclusion in democratization 
processes in developing countries.  
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1.5 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis sets out to explain why attempts toward political and social inclusion have 
resulted in exclusion. On the basis of a citizenship approach and related research I seek to 
provide explanations to this puzzle.   
 
Chapter 2 contains the presentation of theoretical concepts and the framework used to 
approach the empirical puzzle and the research question. This includes a brief account on the 
concept of citizenship, primarily based on Stokke (2013), a typology that enables the study of 
the politics of citizenship that is developed by Butenschon (2000), as well as the framework 
of popular mobilization developed by Törnquist et al. (forthcoming) that will be used for the 
analysis of the empirical observations.  
 
In chapter 3 I discuss the methodological choices and challenges underpinning the research 
process. Central to this chapter is the discussion on validity while I simultaneously seek to 
strengthen the reliability of the research.   
 
Chapter 4 provides a contextual backdrop to Nepal, before I present the empirical material in 
chapter 5. The presentation is structured by the concepts outlined in the theory chapter. This 
chapter aims at an elaboration of the empirical puzzle seen through the lens of Butenschon’s 
typology presented in the theory chapter, to understand the political parties’ roles in fostering 
inclusionary or exclusionary policies. Proceeding in chapter 6 is the analysis. I structure the 
analysis around three main factors, according to the theoretical framework: the building of 
political communities, types of rights the actors opt for as well as the channels of 
representation that are developed. Within each of these elements I discuss the changing 
agenda and position of the relevant actors. I conclude in chapter 7 with the main findings of 
the study.  	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2 Theory and approach 
The objective of this paper is to discover and explain the positions over time of the political 
parties in Nepal to the issue of political and social inclusion. I seek to explain the lack of 
more inclusionary politics in Nepal after peace was restored in 2006 and the country 
embarked on a new phase in the process of democratization. I take a citizenship approach to 
the study of inclusion and exclusion in Nepal.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline how I will use the theoretical concepts and the 
framework to approach the research question. The theoretical concepts first and foremost 
serve the purpose of structuring the empirical material, to map out the content and conflicts 
surrounding citizenship in Nepal. I start with a conceptual overview of the concept of 
citizenship. Based on Stokke (2013) I briefly present the four dimensions of the concept of 
modern citizenship. Then follows a short discussion of citizenship as a principle of power 
distribution, and how the lack of citizenship provides a source of legitimation for the state. I 
then proceed by presenting a typology developed by Butenschon (2000) that in the empirical 
chapter serves as a tool for elaborating on the empirical puzzle, to describe the changing 
patterns in the politics of citizenship in Nepal. Finally, I introduce the theoretical framework 
that is used to identify changes in the actors’ agendas, strategies and attempts at fostering (or 
hindering) inclusionary politics. For this purpose I use a tentative framework of popular 
mobilization developed by Törnquist et al. (forthcoming). This is a framework for asking 
questions which instructs us to direct focus toward three main areas: (i) the building of 
political communities, (ii) the character and type of rights, and (iii) the channels for political 
representation.  
 
2.1 Citizenship 
There is a vast scholarly literature on citizenship. The concept itself is rather ambiguous and 
vague, which is reflected in the broad range of academic work and the different approaches to 
the field of study. The common feature of most definitions of citizenship, however, is that it 
is about a “form of membership in a political and geographic community” (Bloemraad, 
Korteweg, Yurdakul, 2008, 154). In the literature it often relates to the substance and 
outreach of citizens’ rights and duties. The following subchapters contain a presentation of 
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different aspects of the concept of citizenship, before I turn to elaborate on Butenschon’s 
typology, which shifts emphasis to the actors and changes in citizenship policies. 
 
2.1.1 Dimensions of modern citizenship 
Modern citizenship is a concept containing four key dimensions: membership, legal status, 
rights and participation3 (Stokke 2013). The four components are interconnected. Citizen 
membership refers to the belonging to a community, and has over the last two centuries 
commonly been related to membership in the nation-state (Heater 1999, 95). There are 
different ways of constructing the nation, understood as the process of defining who are 
included, or considered legitimate members, in the political community that the state 
constitutes. A common distinction is made between the French and the German model. In the 
French tradition the national communities are defined in political terms, as “a body of 
associates living under common laws and represented by the same legislative assembly etc.” 
(Sieyes 1963, 58, cited in Heater 1999, 106, emphasis in original). In the German model, the 
legitimate members of the nation are defined in terms of the ethnic and cultural bonds among 
the people and their historical homeland (ibid., 106). 
 
The legal status is the judicial dimension of citizenship, and it refers to the principles and 
policies for granting citizenship as a legal status (Stokke 2013, 5). Each state has the power to 
define who can and cannot become a citizen of that state (Heater 1999, 80). The legal status 
of citizenship is normally determined by one of two principles: being born within the territory 
of the state, jus soli, or through descent, jus sanguinis. France is a typical example of jus soli, 
whereas Germany is an example of citizenship laws based on the principle of jus sanguinis. A 
third category is citizenship that is achieved, jus domicili, either through marriage or after 
residence within the country for a certain period of time. In reality these principles are often 
not straightforward in the citizenship laws of a state, but rather mixed hybrid systems. Stokke  
(2013, 6) notes that in the context of increasing migration, citizenship through jus sanguinis 
has become more difficult. The denial of citizenship to certain groups of the population in a 
country can lead to marginalization, exclusion and sometimes conflict.  
 
The third dimension of modern citizenship is rights, and concerns the extent and substance of 
citizens’ rights and entitlements. Marshall’s (2006) distinction between civil, political and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This brief account of the four dimensions of modern citizenship primarily builds on a more encompassing 
review article Conceptualizing the Politics of Citizenship by Stokke (2013).  
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social rights can be taken as point of departure for the conceptualization of rights. Civil rights 
protect the individual’s freedom and include rights such as the freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion and the right to own property. Political rights concern the right to political 
participation, including the right to vote and to organize in political parties. Social rights refer 
to welfare rights, such as the right to education, health, labor rights, etc. (Stokke 2013, 7).  
 
Since Marshall developed this categorization of rights, the relationship between the 
categories of rights is an issue that has been much debated (Stokke 2013). One underlying 
tension lies in the different aims of these categories of rights. Whereas equality is the 
principle underpinning the civil and political rights, social rights, on the other hand, are 
designed to address the inequalities between groups. Marshall presented a linear 
understanding of the development of rights, in the sense that he saw them as a successive 
extension of rights: first are civil rights developed, then political rights, and lastly the social 
rights. Today there is a broad agreement that this is not necessarily the case, as the three 
categories of rights may be developed in a different order than what Marshall prescribed 
(Stokke 2013, 9; Heater 1999, 22). Jayal (2013) argues that social rights often is a 
precondition for the effective exercise of civil and political rights.  
 
The final dimension of citizenship is participation, which refers to the responsibilities of 
citizens and the spaces and strategies for exercising citizenship rights. This component is thus 
about participating in the governance of public affairs. Such involvement can take place 
either through direct participation or indirectly through representation (Stokke 2013, 10). 
There are several obstacles and challenges to democratic participation and representation, 
such as a lack of an inclusive definition of the demos, insufficient or ineffective channels for 
representation, lack of a common and broad definition of public affairs, in addition to the 
tendency to evade the control of public affairs from democratic governance (Stokke 2013, 
11).  
 
2.1.2 A principle of power distribution  
Citizenship is the mechanism through which citizens can access the core institutions of the 
state where the decisions are made regarding the use of public resources (Butenschon 2000, 
5). Butenschon consequently argues that citizenship should be understood as a principle of 
power distribution (2000, 12). How the principles of citizenship are shaped is of special 
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importance in the process of state- and nation-building when the political institutions are 
designed, both for the individual in terms of its rights and duties, and for the state with regard 
to its capacity to create a stable political base (ibid., 16). Citizenship is frequently a 
contentious issue around which political and legal struggles revolve, as it is a question of 
controlling how communities with a common identity are constructed, and deciding who are 
entitled to the status as a citizen (ibid., 5).  
 
2.1.3 A source of legitimation 
Having formal status as a citizen does not necessarily mean that one is able to exercise the 
rights that follows from the status. In a study of popular politics and democracy, Chatterjee 
(2004, 34-41) makes a distinction between civil society and political society, arguing that 
governmental practices create these two distinct arenas. While the ‘citizens’ in the civil 
society are perceived as rights-bearing individuals that can govern themselves, the 
‘population’ in the political society is seen as the target of policies that must be governed. 
They are perceived not to be capable of governing themselves. Citizens in the civil society 
have the resources to solve their problems on their own, whereas the population in the 
political society, the subalterns, depend on clientelistic relations with more privileged groups, 
such as political parties or government officials, to meet their needs, often in return for their 
votes. The provision of welfare to these groups is a source of legitimation for the modern 
state (Chatterjee 2004, 40-41).  
 
2.2 The politics of citizenship 
The ‘politics of citizenship’ is a concept referring to “the structures and processes of 
membership in the state” (Maktabi 2000, 147). As a general framework for the study of the 
politics of citizenship, Butenschon (2000) presents a typology of normative principles for 
constituting political communities within state territories. The typology consists of two key 
dimensions: the constitutional principle and the territorial principle. Butenschon introduces 
this as an analytical tool to identify the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion in the design 
of institutions in the process of state- and nation-building. In this study I am not using this 
typology as an analytical tool to approach the regime, but rather as a descriptive tool to map 
the positions of the political parties in Nepal in relation to the politics of citizenship. 
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The constitutional principle of the state refers to the relation between the state institutions and 
the citizens, and whether or not the status and rights of the individual citizen is dependent on 
group belonging. Distinctions are made between singularism, pluralism and universalism.  
 
Singularism as a state building principle refers to states built on one single collective identity. 
The state itself is the manifestation of that identity. Group identities within the polity are 
subordinated to the titular community: “In states with a singularistic state-idea the state is 
often not neutral in the way it relates to group identities and intergroup conflict in the 
population, but is more or less partisan in its promotion of the status and interests of the 
titular community.” (Butenschon 2000, 18) Through citizenship regulations, laws, policies 
and distribution of rights, the state can easily control who gets access to political institutions 
and state territories. Another characteristic feature of the singularistic state is the harsh way it 
represses groups with the potential to challenge the authority of the state (ibid., 18-19).   
 
States built on the principle of pluralism, on the other hand, recognize the various subgroups 
within the polity and relate neutrally to group identities. Power sharing is central to the 
organization of the state, and presupposes mutual respect both among the groups and toward 
the system. Power is devolved from the central government to the subnational level. The 
ideal is that all groups should have an equal say in the shaping of policies, and the 
government’s role is to facilitate compromise (Butenschon 2000, 22).  
 
While group affiliation is central to both singularistic and plural states, it is rendered 
irrelevant in states built on the principle of universalism, in which all citizens under the 
jurisdiction of the state have equal status and rights (Butenschon 2000, 26).  
 
The second dimension of the typology of political regimes concerns the organizing principle 
of the territorial unit(s) of the state. It concerns the relation between the political and 
geographical units on the one hand, and the sociocultural composition of the population on 
the other. Distinctions are made between the unitary state, the fragmented state and separate 
states, depending on whether and how the sociocultural demographic structure of the 
population is represented territorially (see table 1, below).   	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Table 1: Typology – Political organization of state territories 	  
Constitutional 
Principle 
Territorial 
Principles 
  
 The Unitary State The Fragmented State Separate Territories 
Singularism Hegemonic system Imposed self-rule Ethnic 
“Homelands” 
 
Pluralism Consociational 
systems 
 
Cantonization Separate states 
Universalism Majoritarian 
systems 
Federation/Confederation Separate states 	  
Table from Butenschon (2000, 18)  	  
In the empirical inquiry I will place the political parties in the typology according to their 
positions in regard to the two dimensions and show movements within the typology over 
time. I will further see whether any changes within the typology correspond to changes in the 
parties’ citizenship policies toward inclusion or exclusion. In the analysis I use this mapping 
as a point of departure for the analysis of what may explain the political parties’ positions to 
the issue of political and social inclusion over time. For this purpose I use the framework of 
popular mobilization presented below. 
 
2.3 A framework of popular mobilization  
In the introduction to this thesis I presented the observation that efforts toward political and 
social inclusion in Nepal have resulted in exclusion. In the analysis I seek to explain this 
puzzle. For this purpose I will use a tentative framework of popular mobilization developed 
by Törnquist et al. (forthcoming). It is a framework for asking questions that dig into the 
dynamics of the politics of citizenship. The framework is developed in order to analyze 
problems and options of transformative politics to enable the combination of equality and 
economic development. The framework consists of three elements: (i) the formation of 
political communities, (ii) the type and character of rights that actors opt for, and (iii) the 
channels of political representation that are developed. Within the overall framework of 
popular mobilization I develop sub-frameworks that enable the analysis of the options and 
strategies of popular mobilization. The elements of the framework are expanded upon in the 
following section.   
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2.3.1 Building political communities  
The first element of the framework of popular mobilization concerns the building of political 
communities within the polity. This element asks us to direct attention toward how the actors 
form communities for political action. It is in other words the collective struggles of a group 
of people who perceive that they have something in common (Törnquist et al. forthcoming).  
 
In the analysis of the construction of political communities there are two basic dimensions: 
content and form. The content refers to how the group is constituted, that is, what people 
have in common. It may be an ideology, an identity, a strategy, issues or interests. The form 
refers to the collective action: how they get together and how they organize. The framework 
thus asks us to consider why and how these groups are constituted: what do they have in 
common, and how do they get together? (Törnquist et al. forthcoming)  
 
Content 
To study the political communities parties have built up, requests a study of the character and 
the basis of representation between the political representative and the people represented. It 
is thus not about the method of representation (which will be treated below), but the content 
of what is represented. Pitkin’s (1967) classical study of representation distinguishes between 
three forms of representation: substantive, descriptive and symbolic. Substantive 
representation is based on interests or issues, in which the represented acts on behalf of a 
community by virtue of them having common interests or issues. One example is a trade 
union leader fighting for the workers’ rights. Descriptive representation refers to the 
representative standing for a community on the basis of common characteristics they share, 
such as an ethnic leader representing his ethnic community. Symbolic representation is also 
about the representative standing for a community, but in contrast to being rooted in common 
descriptive characteristics, the representative symbolizes his/her constituency by virtue of a 
common identity or culture. An example is a King or a Queen symbolizing the nation. While 
in Pitkin’s (1967) understanding identities are seen as predefined constituencies, identities are 
today more often conceived of as socially constructed ‘imagined communities’. This concept 
originally stems from Anderson (2006, 6-7) who argues that nations should be seen as 
socially constructed ‘imagined political communities’. His argument is that in spite of the 
nation being so big that most members will never see or hear about each other, the perception 
of the commonality they share lives in the imagination of all, irrespective of any inequalities 
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and exploitation that may exist within the nation. This dimension of the framework is thus 
not about how leaders seek to construct the communities, but rather about what the 
community imagines to have in common. 
 
Form  
The second dimension in the building of political communities concerns the form and refers 
to the political mobilization and organization: do they get together as small or big groups, is it 
top-down relations or is it more bottom-up? Is the political community formed behind a 
leader, a patron or an organization? The form may thus be based on populist, patronage, 
interests or group-based politics (Törnquist et al. forthcoming).  
 
Mouzelis (1998) distinguishes between three ideal types of modes of political inclusion of the 
popular masses. The integrative mode refers to the integration of people into politics on a 
relatively equal basis, such as autonomous horizontally organized interest groups. According 
to Mouzelis (1998, 65) it is due to the negative legacy of patrimonial features that the 
political integration of popular masses in developing countries tends to fail. The 
incorporative-clientelistic mode reflects the incorporation of people into the political arena 
through already existing clientelistic networks. There are bosses and patrons at different 
levels that are capable of providing goods or services to their clientelistic networks. Both the 
integrative mode and the incorporative-clientelistic mode thus presupposes strong 
organizational intermediaries that often have a strong degree of autonomy in relation to the 
national leadership. This stands in contrast to the incorporative-populistic mode, which refers 
to the incorporation of the lower classes through populist mechanisms (Mouzelis 1998, 67). 
People become active on the political arena “via the masses’ attachment to a leader whose 
charisma becomes the major source of legitimation, and whose plebiscitarian organization (if 
any) becomes the main link between civil society interests and the public sphere” (Mouzelis 
1998, 64). The leaders thus have to express popular feelings, ideas and/or interests (Törnquist 
2002, 40). The difference between clientelism and populism lies in that there in the former is 
an established asymmetry in the relation between the patron and the client(s). The patron 
does not seek to represent him/herself as one ‘of the people’, but his/her legitimacy rather 
rests on the ability to provide the goods and services as promised to the clients. A populist 
leader, on the other hand, seeks to represent him/herself as ‘one of the people’. That is the 
source from which the leader gains his/her legitimacy.  
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2.3.2 Rights  
The second part of the framework concerns the type and the character of the rights the actors 
opt for. Given the political communities that are established and organized, what kind of 
rights do they prioritize? Previously in this chapter distinctions were made between civil, 
political and social rights (the latter including economic rights). Another relevant distinction 
is whether the actors advocate for universal rights or for group-specific rights.  
 
In the academic literature there has been an increasing focus on the relationship between 
universal rights and group-specific rights. In liberal theory the principle of universality in 
citizenship is argued to be the key to integration and equality. However, as pointed out above, 
having the formal status of citizen does not necessarily translate into the effective exercise of 
citizenship rights. Grugel (2002) points to the experiences of developing countries, observing 
that extreme income inequalities may hinder the equal exercise of citizenship rights. The aim 
of group-specific rights is to correct this imbalance, as well as to secure the special needs of 
minorities within the polity (Jayal 2013). The potential of group rights to foster long-term 
inclusion is debated in regard to its potential to address the causes of structural inequality that 
is leading to social and political exclusion (Webster 2013, 4). Affirmative action may instead 
of fostering equality end up institutionalizing difference and entrenching exclusion (Jayal 
2013, 16-17).  
 
Young (2011, 16-17) argues that denying group-specific rights hide group oppression. When 
group commonality is emphasized at the expense of a particular group belonging, laws and 
rights will be constructed from the values and identity of the strongest groups, while the 
minorities’ values and identities end up being undermined. Kymlicka (1995) also argues in 
favor of group-specific rights, claiming that in multicultural societies such are necessary for 
three reasons: to address problems of group inequality, to adhere with group rights that have 
been given at an earlier point in history and to preserve cultural diversity. In this respect he 
proposes three types of rights: self-government rights for minorities within the state, 
polyethnic rights to protect minorities’ identities and culture, and special representation rights 
to secure minorities’ representation in political institutions (ibid., 27-33). While the objective 
of the two latter is political integration of the minority groups into the national political 
community, self-government rights may have a disintegrating effect in that it challenges the 
definition of the state as one political community (Stokke 2013, 17-18).  
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2.3.3 Political representation 
The political representation concerns the channels of representation that are developed, that 
is, how the issues and interests of the political community are taken to the level of public 
governance. The question of representation concerns the actual linkages between people in 
society and the state or other subcontracted or self-appointed institutions of public 
governance. Thus the chain of representation also includes the political parties’ and their 
strategies when trying to reach out to people and institutions. Given the content of the 
political community, how, and with what degree of accountability and responsiveness, are the 
representatives of the masses authorized and legitimized? What method do they choose, and 
what are the mediating links? The mediating links between the people and the institutions of 
governance (and their various arrangements for participation such as the parliament) may be 
through issue- or interest-based civil society organizations, rights-based campaigns, informal 
leaders, political parties or individual candidates (Törnquist 2013, 66). This element thus 
concerns the channels for representation and the character of the links between the 
representatives and the represented.  
 
Groups are socially constructed, and a major tendency is that leaders claim the legitimacy of 
the groups on basis of interests and constructed identities, such as class, ethnicity, nation, 
interests, issues, strategy or religion (Stokke and Selboe 2009). The understanding of 
identities as being socially constructed implies the assumption that the specific construction 
serves a practical purpose, which is closely related to power relations: 
Although there is an understandable desire to search for objective defining 
criteria of a certain social group, these are always symbolic representations 
that may be used strategically to further the interests of specific actors. Thus, 
the making of social units is not about some kind of realisation or awakening 
of a predefined group delimited by objective criteria, but rather about 
symbolic construction and contestation. Group making is about struggles over 
meaning […], to make and unmake groups. (Stokke and Selboe 2009, 66 
emphasis in original) 
 
Stokke and Selboe (2009, 60) point to the special importance of symbolic representation in 
the context of identity politics, and that this should be understood as a political practice. The 
symbolic representation is constantly negotiated as the actors contest for promoting and 
gaining legitimacy of a world-view that is in their interest, and they seek to establish 
themselves as legitimate representatives of their political constituencies. The power of the 
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ideas of the political actors is thus not about how true their views and perceptions are, but to 
what extent they manage to mobilize a group of people (ibid., 66).  
 
2.3.4 Motivation for choice of framework 
While the three elements of the framework of popular mobilization are important in all types 
of transformative politics, any changes that can be traced in regard to each of the elements are 
contextual. The empirical puzzle that is the point of departure for this thesis suggests that in 
the case of Nepal, the changing context relating to new structural and institutional conditions 
in the process of democratization have led to changes in the actors’ agendas and 
prioritizations. Törnquist et al. (forthcoming) have found that the three elements of the 
framework of popular mobilization may have an influence on the attempts at inclusionary 
politics. This suggests that we can find changes within these elements that can explain the 
lack of more inclusionary politics in Nepal. This may be related to political communities 
having become more fragmented. If they are built on the special interests within the 
communities rather than the general interests it may explain the lack of inclusionary politics. 
Likewise, the type of rights the actors opt for may be more specific than uniting, hence not 
fostering inclusionary politics. Furthermore, the channels of representation the actors use 
request specific forms of legitimation and authorization that may be a hinder to more 
inclusionary politics. 
  
2.4 Summing up 
In this chapter I have presented the theoretical approach to the empirical puzzle and the 
research question for this paper. It consists of three parts: (i) the conceptualization of 
citizenship which serves the purpose of structuring the empirical material, (ii) the typology of 
the political organization of state territories, which provides a tool for identifying the political 
parties’ relations to the politics of citizenship, and (iii) the framework of popular mobilization 
that will be used to analyze changes in the actors’ attempts at inclusionary politics in Nepal. 
Before I turn to the empirical inquiry and the analysis, I will in the following chapter discuss 
the methodological choices and challenges that have guided the work during the research 
process.  	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3 Methodological considerations 
In this chapter I discuss the methodological choices and challenges faced during the research 
process. All social science research ought to aim at high validity and reliability. Validity 
refers to whether the researcher is actually measuring what she thinks she is, whereas 
reliability concerns the trustworthiness and degree of openness on how the research process 
has been conducted (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 23-25). I have taken a qualitative 
approach to the research question. The purpose of this chapter is to guide the reader through 
the procedures of the research process and elaborate on my methodological choices in order 
strengthen the validity and reliability of the research project. I start with a presentation of the 
choice of research design and then proceed with the discussion on collection of data and 
related methodological challenges. This includes reflections on the fieldwork, selection of 
informants and interviews, as well as the access to and choice of document sources. 
Questions relating to validity and reliability will be discussed throughout the chapter.  
 
3.1 Research design 
The empirical interest of this study is to provide explanations to the empirical puzzle that is 
observed, namely that attempts at social and political inclusion in Nepal have resulted in 
exclusion. This requires an in-depth study of the phenomenon over time, that is, the 
mechanisms of social and political inclusion and exclusion in the process of democratization 
in Nepal. The choice of research design thus logically falls on the case study, which allows 
for a thick description and in-depth analysis of the actors and their intentions, as well as the 
context to understand the phenomenon as a whole. The analytical single case study allows to 
focus on a wide set of explanatory factors (George and Bennett 2005, 21).  
 
The study is a single case study containing several units. The within-case units comprise the 
four political parties/movements, of which several observations are done over time. 
According to Gerring (2007, 20), the purpose of a single case study has to be “at least in part 
- to shed light on a larger class of cases”. This single case study of social and political 
inclusion and exclusion in the democratization process in Nepal has first and foremost the 
objective of providing explanations particularly in regard to the democratization process in 
Nepal, but also for possible generalization to processes in similar contexts. Such a 
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generalization would then be to explain challenges to fostering political and social inclusion 
in democratization processes in multicultural societies in developing countries.  
 
The case is given by empirical facts: Nepal as a multicultural society in which there are 
challenges to the equal exercise of citizenship rights. I want to identify the apparent and 
underlying causes of the actors’ positions to the issue of social and political inclusion in order 
to find out why attempts at inclusion have resulted in exclusion. This is done well aware of 
the difficulties of examining and establishing causal relationships. The nature of the empirical 
puzzle, however, requires me to move into this field. The strength of using case study as a 
research design lies in the possibilities to establish general relations that can form the basis 
for new knowledge that can be tested elsewhere. While the case study approach is commonly 
criticized for the low potential for generalization, the objective of this study is not to 
conclude with strong implications for generalization. Nevertheless, I believe that my 
observations and conclusions may be of value in further studies in similar contexts, however, 
with the need to be tested more systematically.  
 
Whereas the spatial boundaries of the case are given as the state of Nepal, there is a need to 
define temporal boundaries as well. I have limited the time points to be studied to two main 
periods that I deem crucial to analyze the political parties/movements and positions in regard 
to political and social inclusion in the democratization process, as pointed to in the 
introduction. These two periods are (i) from the restoration of democracy in 1990 and until 
the Maoist insurgency had been launched in 1996, and (ii) from peace was restored in 2006 
and until the Constituent Assembly was dissolved in 2012.   
 
I have taken an inductive approach to the research process. Based on the procedure as 
described by Bryman (2004), the process has been as follows: the point of departure is the 
empirical observation that efforts toward political and social inclusion have resulted in 
exclusion in Nepal. This inevitably warrants a study of the major political parties involved in 
this process. I went to Nepal to conduct preliminary research, where I identified relevant 
informants that could help me to identify and throw light on the processes of political and 
social inclusion and exclusion. In the theory chapter I elaborated on my approach to the 
research question, and how I apply the theoretical tools and framework for descriptive and 
analytical purposes, using Butenschon’s typology as a tool to describe the changes in the 
political parties’ relation to the politics of citizenship, i.e. to elaborate on the empirical 
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puzzle. This further led me to the theoretical framework developed by Törnquist et al. 
(forthcoming), which identifies the factors that may provide a frame for discussing possible 
explanations to the empirical puzzle. Through the work with this combined theoretical 
framework I could further specify the research question and collect more data to conduct the 
analysis as demanded by the theoretical framework. It is from this analysis I present my 
findings and conclusions. 
 
3.2 Collection of data and methodological challenges 
I take a qualitative approach to the case study. Documents are the primary source of data 
material, while the interviews I have conducted have served the purpose of informing my 
research at an early stage of the research process in order to elaborate on the empirical 
puzzle. In the following section I discuss some methodological reflections around the 
selection and use of sources.  
 
Field work and interviews 
The fieldwork was conducted in Nepal during September and October of 2013. Prior to 
departure I approached the Center for Media Research - Nepal who have been working 
extensively on the political development in Nepal and employees at the Royal Norwegian 
Embassy in Kathmandu. These contacts were very helpful in identifying relevant informants.    
 
I first and foremost sought to interview key informants with special knowledge on conflicts 
surrounding citizenship in Nepal, such as representatives from non-governmental 
organizations, a journalist, bureaucrats and politicians from the four political parties included 
in this study4. I conducted most of my interviews in Kathmandu, and some in the district of 
Makwanpur, south of the capital city. The reason for this was that I wanted to gain 
understanding of the empirical phenomenon both from urban and rural perspectives. 
 
I conducted semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions. This was a natural 
choice as I had some specific issues I wanted to talk about, but at the same time leave open 
some space for my informants to raise the issues they deemed to be of importance. The 
interview guide was adapted in advance to each informant. Furthermore, depending on how 
the conversations evolved I had the possibility to add and remove questions during the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See list of informants in appendix A.  
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interviews5. In order to not loose out on any information I chose to use a tape recorder during 
all my interviews.  
 
There is a potential bias in my selection of informants. As I do not speak Nepali I decided to 
focus my interviews on English-speaking respondents. Speaking to non-English-speaking 
informants may have increased the pool of potential informants and therefore broadened the 
scope of the interviews and provided me with different information then the one I have 
obtained. I had to use an interpreter during some of my interviews. This posed a challenge in 
that I felt I was not entirely in control of the situation, not fully understanding everything 
being said. To have everything transcribed was very useful in the aftermath of the interviews.  
 
When choosing the research topic I was aware of the possible challenges related to the study 
of a sensitive issue such as social and political inclusion and exclusion, and challenges it 
could lead to in the process of collecting the data material. During the interviews it was 
challenging to get in-depth answers on the topics I asked about, and I several times 
experienced that informants were more focused on their own agenda than talking about 
political and social exclusion that was ‘no longer a problem’. Berry (2002) notes that the 
researcher always has to “keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective 
and to tell us the truth (…) They’re talking about their work and, as such, justifying what they 
do.” (Berry 2002, 680) One technique I applied in order to compensate for the challenges 
related to the sensitive nature of the research topic was to ask about other actors’ agendas and 
actions. Fully aware of possible tendencies to take the opportunity to ‘throw mud’ on their 
competitors, I nevertheless found this a valuable approach. I furthermore applied the 
‘snowball technique’, asking my informants for suggestions to whom else I should talk to 
regarding specific topics. This can have led to a bias in the selection of informants, as people 
may tend to suggest people whom they know are of similar mind as themselves. In order to 
make up for this potential imbalance I have gathered information from multiple sources. 
During the interviews I also received very useful suggestions to relevant literature that my 
informants referred to.  
 
In the interviews I asked about various conflicts relating to citizenship based on what I had 
read in the literature, including the challenges to the equal exercise of citizenship rights. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This resulted in quite different interviews, I have thus chosen not to attach the interview guide in the appendix, 
as there is no ’representative’ guide of the interviews in general.  
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topics of tension presented in the empirical inquiry are based on what my informants told me, 
in combination with relevant literature as a part of the triangulation approach. 
  
Document analysis 
Given the preliminary and exploring role of the fieldwork in the research process and the 
information gathered through the interviews, the qualitative analysis of relevant documents 
has provided the main source of data for the analysis. The data material includes both 
primary and secondary literature, and comprises journal articles, books, reports from UN 
agencies and other non-governmental organizations, official documents from the government, 
laws and regulations, as well as newspaper articles. The material covers the time-span from 
the restoration of democracy in 1990 and until 2012, with a focus on the two identified 
periods in which observations of the within-case units are done (from 1990 until the Maoist 
insurgency was launched in 1996, and from peace was restored in 2006 until the Constituent 
Assembly was dissolved in 2012).  
 
One challenge I have faced in the collection of data material has been that many official 
documents are available only in Nepali. Since I do not read Nepali, my access to these 
resources has been limited. This has especially posed challenges for the study of 
governmental and political parties’ documents. I have therefore to a large extent had to use 
secondary sources for this purpose, such as academic articles, books and reports from 
international organizations. This has been necessary in order to collect vital information, for 
instance information about the negotiation process in the Constituent Assembly. This poses a 
potential threat to the validity of the data material, both because I to some extent have to rely 
on other’s analysis, as well as the possibility that I misinterpret the facts. To compensate for 
this I have therefore sought to crosscheck the information when possible with various 
sources. Through such triangulation the threat is somewhat mitigated. Crosschecking also 
strengthens the reliability, as it is easier for others to go directly to the sources I have used to 
check the information. Source triangulation is used as a method to strengthen the internal 
validity of the research and avoid internal errors and false conclusions. The degree to which 
my analysis builds on publicly available sources thus strengthens the reliability of the 
research project. 
  
	  	  31	  
 
 
	   32	  
4 Contextual backdrop 
Nepal is a landlocked, developing country, sandwiched between two giants: India in the 
south, east and west, and Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China in the 
north. Nepal stretches over 147 181 km2 and inhabits approximately 26.5 million people6. It 
is a rural country, with the agricultural sector employing about 75 percent of the population. 
Nepal is among the least developed countries in the world, with approximately 25 percent of 
the population living below the national poverty line7. The country has never been colonized. 
 
The unification of Nepal started in the late 18th century when several kingdoms and 
principalities were gathered under king Privit Narayan Shah of the kingdom of Gorkha, 
bringing together numerous ethnic and cultural groups. Nepal was ruled by the powerful 
Shah and Rana dynasties from 1768 until 1951. The society was strictly top-down ruled, with 
power and authority gathered in the hands of the dynasties (Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan 
2012). Growing popular discontent led to the end of Rana rule in 1951 and democracy was 
introduced. The 1950s were marked by political instability, and the monarchy grew stronger. 
In 1960, King Mahendra ousted the democratically elected government, and two years later 
he introduced the Panchayat system. All political parties were now by constitution banned, 
and all power was gathered in the king’s hands. The Panchayat system lasted for 28 years. 
Social discontent culminated in the People’s Movement in 1990, a broad popular movement 
uniting political parties and civil society organizations, leading to the restoration of 
democracy.  
 
Nepal is a multi-ethnic and multicultural country. The 2011 census recorded 126 caste and 
ethnic groups, 123 languages and 10 religious groups 8 (CBS 2012, 4). 81 percent of the 
population is Hindu. In terms of ethnic groups there is no clear majority but numerous 
minorities (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 77). The inequality between groups and between regions 
has been extreme. During the 1990s, Nepal was one of the most unequal countries in South 
Asia (Lawoti 2007a, 10). Although the countries’ overall ranking in the Human Development 
Index has increased steadily, the progress has been centered around the Kathmandu valley 
and other urban areas (Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan 2012, 8-9). Historically there have not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Population	  as	  of	  June	  2011	  (CBS	  2012,	  1).	  	  7	  Percentage	  last	  updated	  in	  2011	  (The	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  	  	  	  8	  The	  categories	  of	  ethnic	  group	  and	  caste	  group	  are	  often	  overlapping	  and	  not	  easy	  distinguishable.	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been any major inter-ethnic or inter-group conflicts in Nepal. Ethnic identities have only 
become politicized in the last decade (Sharma 1997, 472).  
 
The rise of identity politics in Nepal is closely related to the Maoist insurgency. The Maoists 
launched an armed revolt against the government in 1996 that led the country into a decade-
long armed conflict, due to what they saw as the lack of progress in the process of 
democratization. The Maoists mobilized heavily on the basis of ethnic grievances toward the 
state. The guerilla warfare strategy consisted in attacking state institutions in the rural 
districts and establishing bases here, in order to gradually encircle the cities (Hutt 2004b, 5-
6). As the Maoists gained rural territories, they established their own people’s governments in 
these areas. The government initially responded with harsh measures, but later tried to 
negotiate with the Maoists. A peace agreement was signed in 2006, providing for the election 
of a constituent assembly with the mandate to draft the country’s new constitution, one of the 
longstanding demands of the Maoists. The election for the Constituent Assembly was held in 
2008, in which the Maoists, whom by then had resumed parliamentary politics, won a 
landslide victory. The inclusion of historically marginalized groups has since 2006 been on 
the top of the political agenda. In the constitution-in-making, the marginalized groups are 
defined as:  
(…) those communities who are subject to political, economical and social 
backwardness, are not able to use services and facilities due to discrimination 
and persecution or geographical remoteness or are deprived of such services 
and facilities and are in a status below the standard of the latest human 
development index as determined by law, and this term also includes the 
communities which are highly marginalized and on the verge of extinct. 
(Constituent Assembly Secretariat 2010, 13) 
 
In Nepal, this comprises women, the indigenous nationalities, the Madhesi population in the 
southern Tarai and the Dalits (the low caste). The three latter groups make up more than 2/3 
of the population in Nepal (Lawoti 2007a, 9).  
 
The Constituent Assembly failed to reach agreement on contentious issues relating to the 
restructuring of the state. It was dissolved in May 2012 without having produced a draft 
constitution. A new constituent assembly was elected in November 2013.  	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5 Empirical inquiry 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the positions of the political parties in Nepal to 
the issue of political and social inclusion since democracy was restored in 1990 and until 
2012, with a focus on the time periods of 1990-1996 and 2006-2012. The first part of this 
chapter is a descriptive overview of the content of citizenship and conflicts surrounding 
citizenship in Nepal9. The second part comprises an account of recent changes in the politics 
of citizenship. I will place the political parties according to Butenschon’s typology of the 
political organization of state territories that was presented in the theory chapter, and identify 
how the political parties have moved along within the typology since democracy was restored 
in 1990. I then describe whether and how the changing patterns within the typology 
correspond to any changes in the political parties’ citizenship policies. The aim is to identify 
what have been the results of their demands and policies in terms of fostering inclusion or 
exclusion in Nepal.  
 
5.1 Citizenship in Nepal 
In the theory chapter I referred to four dimensions of modern citizenship: membership, legal 
status, rights and participation. I use these four dimensions as a starting point for discussing 
the content and main conflicts surrounding citizenship in Nepal. Due to the limited scope of 
this thesis I will not be able to provide an all-encompassing account of the content of 
citizenship. Based on what I have read from the relevant literature as well as the issues that 
were raised during my interviews in Nepal, I limit myself to the most central topics of the 
debate within each of these dimensions10.  
 
5.1.1 Membership 
Membership refers to the state as a political community. A distinction was made between the 
French and the German way of constructing nationhood, the former based on the territorial 
state, and the latter on ethno-cultural bonds between the people and their territories (Stokke 
2013, 5). In the following I describe the construction of nationhood in Nepal and how recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This study maps out conflict surrounding citizenship in relation to political parties. The role of civil society or 
other actors in contesting citizenship is outside the scope of this thesis.  
10 The literature I have consulted comprise academic articles, books, reports, legal documents and online sources 
such as articles from newspapers and reports from non-governmental organizations. 
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years have seen a challenge to the idea of the ‘Nepali identity’. I will demonstrate the 
political parties’ role in sustaining and challenging this conception.  
 
The unitary state and the ‘Nepali identity’ 
Politics in Nepal has been, and continues to be, highly dependent on ethnicity and caste. The 
high hill Hindu caste has since the state of Nepal was first established in 1769 been the 
dominating actor in the political, social and economic sphere (Lawoti 2007a, 9). This group is 
considered as one ethnic group, and accounts for approximately 31 percent of the Nepali 
population (ibid., 9).  
 
The high caste hill people’s control over politics and society in Nepal has roots back to the 
Shah and Rana regimes (1768-1846 and 1846-1951). The caste based hierarchical system was 
institutionalized in Nepal in 1854 when Muluki Ain (‘law on the country’) was introduced, a 
national legal code that established different rules for each ethnic group and caste. This meant 
that each persons’ rights, for example property or trading rights, depended on what ethnic 
group or caste the person belonged to (de Sales 2007, 330). The system served the purpose of 
centralizing the state and concentrating power in the hands of the Hindu elite. The indigenous 
populations were subject to rule, and institutionalization of inequality was a fact (Lawoti 
2007a, 8-9). Although the caste system officially was abolished in 1963 it is still today a 
highly vivid and rigid system, penetrating all spheres of society (Einsiedel, Malone, and 
Pradhan 2012, 13).  
 
A second phase of asserting the dominance of Hindu culture in Nepal was during the party-
less Panchayat system (1960-1990)11. This period saw a centralized nation-state building 
process in which the King sought to eradicate all cultural differences and create ‘one Nepali 
identity’, based on the Hindu culture, Hindu religion and the Nepali language (Tamang 2011, 
297). The slogan sounded: “one country, one dress, one language” (ICG 2007, 3). The 
discrimination of the non-Hindus and the low caste Hindus extended into the economic 
sphere, for example by the state’s distribution of land to the high caste while other groups had 
to take on heavier tax burdens (Tamang 2011, 299). This period saw an active creation of the 
Nepali political community. The ‘Nepali identity’ has thus been built on the life style and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The word ‘Panchayat’ means village council, which was the central institution of the political system. All 
political parties were by constitution banned, but they operated underground during these years. The system 
served the purpose of institutionalizing all power in the hands of the King. 
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norms of the Hindu hill upper caste. This bias toward the population of the hills as the ‘real’ 
Nepalese has been an influencing thought since then, resulting in the continuous exclusion of 
different ethnic groups in Nepal (ibid., 299).  
 
Politically, the high hill Hindu caste primarily is associated to the Nepali Congress (NC) and 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) (UML), the two political parties 
that historically have dominated the political scene in Nepal. The NC was established in 1947 
and is one of the oldest parties in Nepal. It is the country’s leading conservative party, with 
the support base drawn mainly from the upper and middle class (Einsiedel, Malone, and 
Pradhan 2012, 17). Historically, the NC has combined the struggle for democracy with the 
quest to preserve Nepali nationalism and the ‘Nepali identity’ (Dhungel 2007, 29).  
 
UML is the traditional communist party in Nepal, with a history that goes back to 194912. 
With the restoration of democracy in 1990 the party made an ideological step away from a 
revolutionary agenda to recognizing multiparty democracy, believing “in the harmony and 
the unity among the people of all religions, castes, communities and ethnic groups living in 
different geographical regions of the country” (Dhungel 2007, 45). As the party has moved to 
the center politically, there are few signs of UML’s revolutionary past. Facing radical forces 
such as the Maoists and other ethnic-based parties UML seems to have moved even further to 
the right. Compared to the NC the party to some extent represents the less well off, with the 
support base drawn primarily from the representation of the interests of trade unions, college 
students and teachers (ibid.). 
 
To some extent, the restoration of democracy in 1990 broke with the unitary past of the 
Nepali state. The new constitution of 1990 recognized multiculturalism, at least on paper, for 
the first time acknowledging multilingualism and multi-ethnicity, defining Nepal as: “a 
multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and 
Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom” and “the Nepalese people irrespective of religion, 
race, caste or tribe, collectively constitute the nation” (Constitution of Nepal 1990). Nepal 
was still a Hindu Kingdom, and Nepalese language continued to be the only official 
language. All people were to be equal citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, caste, religion or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12A number of communist parties have existed in Nepal since the late 1940s. The UML of today was established 
in 1991 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-ML) merged with the Communist Party 
of Nepal (Marxist) and jointly formed the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML). 
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community belonging. However, in practice, native languages and cultures were not equally 
recognized, resulting in continuing discrimination (Lawoti 2007a, 14-15). In sum, the 1990 
constitution ensured the continuation of the main features of Nepali nationalism: the 
kingdom, Nepali language and Hinduism, seeking to further strengthening the idea of the 
unity of the various social, cultural and ethnic groups in Nepal (Hachhethu 2003, 231).  
 
The rise of ethnic politics 
Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, the ideas of the ‘Nepali identity’ and the unity of 
the nation have increasingly been challenged. Whereas it previously was caste belonging 
deciding group solidarity and political participation, it is becoming increasingly depending on 
ethnic identities (Bleie 2010, 50). The quick rise of identity politics in Nepal is first and 
foremost a cause effect of the Maoist insurgency and their mobilization strategy.  
 
A number of organizations based on caste, class, community and professional groups 
appeared on the political arena in the aftermath of the restoration of democracy in 1990. 
These groups were addressing the inequity in Nepal, and raised their voices for their 
integration into the society as equal citizens. However, the Maoists were the first to seriously 
raise the issues of previously marginalized groups on the political arena. The Maoists 
launched their insurgency in 1996 due to what they saw as the failure of the ruling parties to 
bring about change in the society. There were no signs of improvement in decreasing the 
huge inequalities or addressing the poverty and corruption. They saw with dismal on the 
social, economic, cultural and linguistic dominance of the high hill Hindu caste (Hutt 2004a). 
 
The origins of the Maoist party (UCPN(M)) goes back to the late 1960s13. The Maoist 
movement originated as a class movement with the aim of establishing a communist state, a 
‘People’s Democracy’ (Lawoti 2007a, 23). A strategically successful mobilization on the 
basis of ethnic grievances toward the state built up a broad support in the population (Hutt 
2004b; Thapa and Sijapati 2004). The Maoist party had joined the general elections in 1991 
and won nine out of 205 seats, making the third largest party in parliament (after the NC and 
UML), but failed to win any seats in the 1994 election (Hutt 2004b, 4-5). The Maoists were 
criticizing the inefficient system of parliamentary democracy. Prior to the insurgency they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 UCPN(M) is the current name of the main Maoist party in Nepal. Since the party was first established in the 
1960s there has been a series of splitting, merging and renaming of the party. I will throughout this thesis refer 
to it as the ‘Maoist party/movement’ or ‘the Maoists’, when I refer to a period in which it was known under a 
different name. 
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submitted a 40 point demand to the government, demanding an “end to the intrusion into 
Nepal and domination of foreign elements; for a secular state free of all discrimination and 
oppression with the monarchy stripped of its privileges; and for a wider range of welfare 
provisions and social and economic reforms” (Hutt 2004b, 5). The government was given a 
time period of 13 days to address these claims. The government did not make any promises in 
this direction, and the Maoists subsequently launched their insurgency 13 February 199614. 
 
The Maoists first and foremost mobilized on the basis of ethnicity, but also on discrimination 
based on caste, gender and religion: “The Maoists skillfully presented their fight as being 
everything for everyone, encompassing aggrieved groups and cutting across class and ethnic 
boundaries.” (Thapa 2012, 51) They promised to end social and economic inequality and 
discrimination, and supported cultural autonomy, the right to self-determination for ethnic 
groups, the secularization of the state, equal rights and language rights. The Maoists gained 
support mainly from the peasants, laborers and people from marginalized groups like the 
Dalits and various ethnic groups. Their mobilization strategy was based on a combination of 
awareness-raising activities among marginalized groups along with an aspect of threat. The 
Maoist soldiers were often merciless toward anti-communist sympathizers (Hutt 2004a).  
 
When the Maoists resumed parliamentary politics in 2006 they expanded their political base 
by appealing to new groups, including students, the working class, teachers, public servants, 
and intellectuals. This has made UCPN(M) a lot more representative of the Nepali population 
than any other political party in Nepal.  
 
The Maoists claim their difference from mainstream political parties in that they are seeking 
to create a new system by including the historically marginalized populations and building a 
sovereign state that breaks with the feudal system (Adhikari 2012, 281). For this purpose they 
propose an ethnic-based federal system that gives the various ethnic and caste groups the 
right to self-determination in their historical homelands (ibid., 281). 
 
The Maoists also mobilized heavily among the Madhesi population in the Tarai region. The 
Madhesis originally are of Indian descent, they speak Hindi, and their culture is similar to the 
north Indian. Under the Panchayat system, as part of the King’s assimilation and Nepalization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The insurgency was launched four days prior to the set deadline in the 40 point charter. 
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process a large share of hill-origin Nepalese migrated to the Tarai region, with the 
government’s promises of access to resources. Land and forest were distributed in the hill 
populations’ favor. Contrary to most ethnic groups across Nepal that were subject to this 
homogenization process, the Madhesi population responded by stronger holding on to their 
distinct Madhesi identity (Hachhethu 2007a, 8). 
  
The Tarai population constitutes about half of the total population in Nepal, and among these, 
approximately 1/3 are hill origin people. The state has to a large extent ignored the 
marginalization the Madhesi community has been subject to (Tamang 2011). It was not until 
the uprising in 2007 that their demands and recognition seriously have been taken onto the 
political agenda. After the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in 2007 a coalition of 
civil society organizations moved out to the streets raising two demands: a proportionate 
number of seats in the upcoming Constituent Assembly according to the demography of the 
region, and the amendment of federalization into the Interim Constitution.  
  
The uprising was threatening the recently established peace, and the political parties thus 
quickly decided to amend the Interim Constitution accordingly to Madhesi claims. MJF, who 
had been the leading actor in the uprising registered as a political party for the 2008 
Constituent Assembly election. MJF has since then continued to advocate for the recognition 
and the rights of the Madhesi population, with a main focus on federalization and the right to 
autonomy15.  
 
The NC and UML have since 1990 taken the position of formally acknowledging pluralism, 
although their commitment to pluralism remained somewhat dubious. They have been 
seeking to make ethnic identities less relevant by pushing for the unity of the Nepali people. 
The construction of nationhood thus follows the French line, of a people living under a 
common law and the same legislative assembly. The Maoists and MJF are leaning more 
toward the German tradition. The Maoists’ spokesperson, Baburam Bhattarai, in 1998 
expressed:  
The oppressed regions within the country are primarily the regions inhabited 
by the indigenous people since time immemorable [sic]. These indigenous 
people dominated regions that were independent tribal states prior to the 
formation of the centralized state in the later half of the eighteen century, have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There have also been split-ups in MJF since 2007. In this thesis I refer to the main fraction of the party, under 
the name Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal (MJF). 
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been reduced to the present most backward and oppressed condition due to the 
internal feudal exploitation and the external semi-colonial oppression. They 
have been left behind [in] the historical development process because of [the] 
blockade of their path of independent development and imposition of socio-
cultural along with economic oppression upon them with the backing of the 
state by those forces who had come from outside. (Brown 1996, 180, cited in 
Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 78-79)  
 
The ethnic and regional autonomy they fight for is founded on the idea of the cultural bonds 
within each group and their historical ties to the regions they live in.  	  
5.1.2 Legal status 
The main principle for granting the legal status of citizenship in Nepal today is jus sanguinis, 
i.e. citizenship provided through descent. The Nepali Citizenship Act 2063 (2006 A.D.) states 
that citizenship can be acquired both through a Nepali mother and through a Nepali father. 
This was the first time the state recognized the provision of citizenship through mother’s 
lineage16. The preceding citizenship act from 1964 provided citizenship only to children 
whose father was Nepali citizen (Nepal Citizenship Act 1964). The 2006 act also, for the first 
time, provided for citizenship on the basis of birthplace17 (Nepal Citizenship Act 2063). It is 
also possible to acquire citizenship through naturalization for foreign women marrying a 
Nepali citizen or for children whose one of the parents are Nepali 18.  
 
Political parties disagree on what the main principle for granting citizenship should be. 
Whereas the NC and UML support that citizenship is to be provided on the basis of descent, 
UCPN(M) and Madhesi parties want citizenship to be provided equally easily to individuals 
that are born in Nepal (for example by migrant parents) and/or individuals that have been 
living in the country for a given period of time. This is an issue that is especially important to 
the Madhesi population, for whom it has been difficult to acquire citizenship due to their 
Indian origins. The Citizenship Act of 2006 enabled approximately 2.2 million people to 
obtain citizenship certificates for the first time, about one million of these of the Madhesi 
population (Tamang 2011, 303). Madhesis have for a long time raised claims for citizenship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 To claim citizenship through mother is possible only for children born after the passage of Nepal Citizenship 
Act 2063 (i.e. 2006). 
17 This provision allows a person born in Nepal before 13 April 1990, and which has been a resident in Nepal 
since then, to acquire citizenship if he/she can present a certificate showing land/house ownership or a voter 
registration card. 
18 To acquire citizenship through naturalization the applicant must fulfill some criteria such as knowledge of 
written and oral Nepali and relinquishing of the foreign citizenship. A foreign man marrying a Nepali woman 
cannot acquire citizenship through naturalization . 
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certificates. The Hindu elite has been reluctant to provide equal citizenship to the Madhesis 
due to the practices of cross-border marriages between Madhesis and Indians. They fear that 
“’Nepal’ – i.e. Nepali land, property, etc. – will soon be owned by ‘Indians’” (Tamang 2011, 
303). The open border with India is mentioned by my informants from the NC and UML as 
the reason for why citizenship should not be provided on the basis of birthplace, but rather 
through descent (Interview VI; Interview VII).   
 
In spite of the 2006 Citizenship Act providing for the acquisition of citizenship through 
mother, there is a lack of implementation of the law (Interview II; Interview IV). During the 
negotiations in the Constituent Assembly there were also discussions regarding the provision 
of citizenship related to gender equality. As the law provides for today, the children of a 
Nepali man marrying a foreigner can acquire citizenship through descent, whereas the 
children of a Nepali women marrying a foreigner can only acquire citizenship through 
naturalization. While UML and UCPN(M) have fought for a non-discriminatory act in this 
regard, the NC and Madhesi parties have not been willing to recognize such a provision. My 
informant from the Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles in the 
Constituent Assembly explained:  
We were fighting a lot to have a non-discriminatory provision in the 
constitution. It was very difficult, and in the end UML, UCPN(M) and the left 
parties were supportive to our proposal to have a non-discriminatory 
provision. But NC and Madhesi party made a dissident opinion and they don’t 
want equality between men and female. (Interview 1)  
 
5.1.3 Rights 
According to Marshall’s categorization of rights a distinction was made between civil, 
political and social rights. The main issue of contestation in relation to rights in Nepal has 
been related to whether (and to what extent) to recognize group-specific rights.  
  
The 1990 Constitution  
The 1st People’s Movement that led to the restoration of democracy in 1990 was driven by 
demands for inclusion and popular participation. During the drafting of the 1990 constitution, 
one of the central issues was how to ‘deal with’ the multicultural features of Nepal that 
during the 28 year long Panchayat regime had been suppressed in order to create the national 
Nepali community, symbolized by the Hindu Kingdom, the Hindu culture and the Nepali 
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language. The 1990 Constitution was Nepal’s fifth19. The King appointed the constitution 
drafting committee, which consisted of representatives of the NC, the United Left Front 
(ULF) and the monarchy20. In the committee there was an overwhelming presence of Hindu 
men from the high caste, and very little representation of the marginalized groups (Lawoti 
2007b, 50). The NC had a strong influence on the process. The members of the committee 
traveled around the country to gather suggestions from the people. The issues that were raised 
were mainly related to linguistic and religious equality, representation of all population 
groups as well as self-determination rights for ethnic groups (Thapa and Sijapati 2004, 76). 
These claims were to some extent supported by the left parties’ representatives in the 
committee (Whelpton 1997, 60; Hutt 1991, 1029). However, in the end, these demands were 
ignored. The commission together with the Interim Government argued that such claims 
would be damaging to the national integration. The leader of the commission expressed 
“dismay over the fact that the vast majority of suggestions submitted to the commission 
concerned linguistic, religious, ethnic and regional issues (…) [and that] it was ’unfortunate’ 
that most suggestions had been about ‘peripheral’ issues” (Hutt 1991, 1028). The 1990 
Constitution primarily endorsed individual rights. The exception was a few social provisions 
for women and Dalits within health, education and employment. Apart from this, there was 
no recognition of inequality or caste- and ethnic-based discrimination (Hachhethu 2003, 232). 
 
The NC and UML in the 1990s 
The call for political rights was at the heart of the popular movement leading to the 
restoration of democracy in 1990. The NC had been a leading actor of the movement, and 
promoted itself as the only democratic party: “Vote for RPP: vote for partyless system; vote 
for communist: vote for one-party dictatorship, vote for NC: vote for democracy.”21 (IIDS 
1993, 36, cited in Hachhethu 2007b, 138) Political and civil rights were central to the NC, 
which had a “strong belief in … parliamentary democracy… in which all individuals enjoy 
the freedom of speech, organization and other political and civil rights” 
(www.nepalicongress.org, cited in Dhungel 2007, 44).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The first constitution was promulgated in 1948, and then subsequent constitutions were promulgated in 1951, 
1959 and 1962. 
20 ULF was a coalition of six communist parties, among them, CPN-ML and Communist Party of Nepal 
(Marxist), the two parties that later merged into UML. 
21 Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal (RPP), in English: National Democratic Party Nepal, is a conservative 
royalist party in Nepal. 
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Social rights gained a broader focus in the run-up to the national elections in 1991, 1994 and 
1999. The NC promising to alleviate poverty and ensure economic development for 
disadvantaged and poor groups, while the UML promised “bread for the hungry, jobs for the 
unemployed, land for the landless, and shelter for the homeless” (Hachhethu 2007b, 141). 
None of the parties delivered on these promises (ibid., 154).  
 
UML raised the issues of representation rights for marginalized groups in state institutions, 
secularization of the state as well as cultural rights to protect ethnic, religious and cultural 
diversity such as mother tongue education (Hachhethu 2003, 241; 2007b, 145; ICG 2012b, 
19). The ‘ethnic issue’ came to gain more attention in the years to come, also on the part of 
the NC. The election manifestos of 1994 and 1999 came to include some cultural rights, such 
as mother tongue in education and the establishment of cultural centers and educational 
reservation quotas, as well as representation of Dalits and backward communities in the party 
and parliament (Hachhethu 2003, 241-243). 
 
The Interim Constitution of 2007 and the Constituent Assembly 
After the peace agreement between the Maoists and the mainstream parties was signed in 
2006 the issue of group-rights has come to the center of the political debate. The Maoists and 
MJF have strongly advocated for the marginalized groups’ social, cultural and political 
rights. The Interim Constitution that was promulgated in 2007 was the first constitution in 
Nepal to guarantee special rights and protection for minorities and marginalized communities 
(Constituent Assembly Secretariat 2010, 18-19). This was also a contested issue in the 
Constituent Assembly’s work on drafting the new constitution.  
 
Both the Interim Constitution and the constitution in making had inclusive features aimed at 
addressing the inequality in Nepal, including the right to proportional representation of ethnic 
minorities, Dalits, women and marginalized groups in state institutions. Socio-economic 
rights, such as the right to free education, basic health, land reform and redistribution, right to 
work, proper wages and social security were also agreed to be included in the new 
constitution (Shrestha 2014, 14). While the Maoists were the prime driver for including these 
rights in the new constitution, they did not manage to translate any of these social rights into 
actual policies during their time in government. Neither did they start to reform the high 
caste-dominated state apparatus to make it more representative. The outcome of their policies 
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to foster inclusion was limited to political representation rights in the Constituent Assembly. 
One of my informants from the NGO sector in Kathmandu noted: 
Civil society and the parties have sufficient capacity to raise a lot of demands, 
but the capacity of the state is weak to fulfill all the demands. It has made our 
politics very aspiration-oriented, and that weakens the government, the 
political system and at the end the state. The politicians have the tendency to 
continuously expand on more rights. But when they come to government they 
simply cannot fulfill those rights. That has happened to all our parties. During 
the elections the politicians go to the masses, when they are elected they come 
to the classes. (Interview II) 
 
5.1.4 Participation 
Participation refers to the spaces and strategies for exercising citizenship rights, and can 
either be through direct participation or indirectly through representation. One of the 
currently most contested issues in Nepal relates to decentralization. The issue has been on the 
political agenda since the restoration of democracy in 1990, but the debate today revolve 
around the restructuring into a federal state. I will come back to the issue of federalization 
more in detail. First I will provide some of the background for the claims for political 
inclusion and how the political parties have related to these, before I discuss two central 
measures taken after 2006 to create more spaces for popular participation and representation; 
the election of the Constituent Assembly and a decentralization reform program. 
 
Political exclusion of marginalized groups 
The 1990 Constitution provided for the adoption of majoritarian institutions. Lawoti (2007b, 
50; 2007c, 59) argues that this resulted in political exclusion in several ways: the unitary state 
structure hindered power sharing among different ethnic and cultural groups as well as 
autonomy to the different groups. The first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system favored the 
two dominating parties, the NC and UML, both whom opposed the suggestion to introduce a 
proportional system. This made it easier for them to introduce policies based on their values 
and priorities. Furthermore, the constitution contained discriminatory provisions. Examples 
include the banning of ethnic or non-Hindu parties and the provision of citizenship only 
through father’s lineage, as well as the lack of minorities’ rights for the promotion and 
protection of cultural and ethnic groups22.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Discriminatory practices, in spite of neutral constitutional provisions, are also frequent. Due to the limited 
scope of this thesis this issue will not be included in this paper. 
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While the restoration of democracy in 1990 opened up some policy space that enabled new 
actors on the political arena, the state continued to be highly centralized and exclusive. The 
high caste dominated the state apparatus at all levels, academia and civil society. In 1999, the 
high castes together with the Newars (an ethnic group) whom constitute approximately 36 
percent of the population were in more than 80 percent of the leadership positions in 
governance (Lawoti 2007b, 48). Minority representation (of women, ethnic and religious 
groups) was low in the general election in 1991, and further declined in the elections in 1994 
and 1999.  
 
Decentralization of governance was included in the 1990 Constitution, yet decision-making 
power was not devolved to the local level. Also the Parliament was weak, as almost all power 
was in the hands of the leaders of the ruling party, and there was little policy space for 
opposition parties (Lawoti 2007a, 16). Two decentralization acts were passed in the years that 
followed: the Village Development Committee, District Development Committee and 
Municipality Act in 1991 and the Local Self Governance Act in 1999. Local bodies were 
created with some revenue collection power and expenditure responsibilities, aiming to 
provide citizens with better public services. Three general elections and two local elections 
were held between 1990 and 1999. After this, elections were not conducted due to the Maoist 
insurgency.  
 
In its public rhetoric, the NC focused on broad popular participation in the development 
planning, arguing that open public debate was necessary for a sound development (Seddon 
1994, 140-141). The NC committed itself to establish “’a new order’ in Nepal, in which 
democracy and development were to go hand in hand” (Seddon 1994, 140). Still, no 
programs were introduced to address the imbalance of political participation and the 
devolution of power remained at a minimum. The UML had a stronger focus on 
decentralization than the NC, but was most of the time in opposition, and thus had limited 
policy space23. Factors related to the elections, such as the lack of education of the voters and 
registering of both voters and ethnic or non-Hindu political parties contributed to upholding 
the elite system (Slavu 2012, 236). In sum, although the government institutions underwent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The NC was in a majority government from 1991 to 1994. After the general election of 1994, UML formed a 
minority government that collapsed within one year. Between 1995 and 1999 there was a number of coalition 
governments before the NC again returned to power in a majority government in 1999. 
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some restructuring, the state remained centralized and state policies underpinned by high 
caste values (Lawoti 2007a, 14-15). 
 
The NC made some minor commitments to the agenda of disadvantaged groups, such as 
amending the party platform in 1995. The amended platform would include 10 percent 
representation of excluded groups in the party committees (women and Dalits), as well as 
distribution of citizenship to a large share of the Tarai population and to ensure their equal 
job opportunities in the state apparatus (Hachhethu 2003, 240-242). However, the agenda of 
exclusion was for both UML and the NC subordinated to other issues (ibid., 244). The parties 
were occupied with inter- and intraparty quarrels. Through the distribution of state resources 
and administrative positions the parties could extend their patrimonial networks (Thapa and 
Sijapati 2004, 80; Hoftun, Whelpton, and Raeper 1999). Politics in the 1990s largely 
represented a continuation of the policies of the Panchayat regime, with little difference 
between the policies of the NC and UML (Panday 2012, 91-92; Dhungel 2007, 46).  
 
Expanding political participation 
The Maoist mobilization and insurgency has led to an expansion of both political 
participation and a broadening of the political agenda: “The ethnicization of politics since the 
beginning of the 1990s may not have succeeded in making politics more inclusive, but is has 
succeeded in putting the issue of inclusion firmly and unavoidably on the agenda of everyday 
politics.” (Hachhethu and Gellner 2008, 20) 
 
Contrary to urban-based NC and UML, the Maoists had a much broader presence across 
Nepal. Throughout the insurgency they established various ethnic and regional fronts, and 
after resuming parliamentary politics in 2006 they kept mobilizing in rural areas. This was a 
crucial factor that led to their electoral victory in 2008. Furthermore, indigenous people came 
to gain leading positions in the Maoist party at the mid-level leadership. This stands in 
contrast to the case of the NC and UML. Still, people of the high Hindu caste have occupied 
the top leadership also in UCPN(M) (Adhikari 2012, 282).  
 
Post 2006 – an agenda for political inclusion? 
The election of the Constituent Assembly in 2008 has been celebrated for being the most 
representative of all political institutions in Nepal. First and foremost because of the new 
electoral system that introduced proportional representation with inclusion quotas alongside 
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the traditional first-past-the-post system, for example ensuring 33 percent representation of 
women (Slavu 2012). The Madhesi movement was crucial for achieving the change of the 
system. Furthermore, the Maoists nominated minority group candidates, which made the 
assembly more representative (ibid., 232). Civil society organizations were invited to join the 
constitution-writing process in open meetings and hearings where they could raise their 
issues and express their views on the current debates. The number of open meetings has been 
very high in some of the committees. The actual impact of the civil society organizations is 
difficult to assess. One of my informants raised the problem of the weak political capacity of 
civil society in Nepal: “There are two types of civil society organizations: rights based and 
duty based. Our traditional civil society is duty-based. When something happens they go to 
the people to deliver services. It is a very poor link between the civil society and the political 
parties.” (Interview II).  
 
Furthermore, critical evaluations state that the constitution-writing process has been elite-led, 
and that in spite of the formal presence of marginalized groups there is still a lack of 
substantial representation (Tamang 2011, 306-307). This issue was also raised by one of my 
informant from civil society:   
The parties internally are not sufficient democratic so they will not promote a 
democratic culture. There was no room for the Constituent Assembly 
members, only 12-13 top leaders who dominated the scene. They controlled 
the parties, the parliament, the executive and subordinated the judiciary. They 
could do it partly because they were reunited. They built a syndicate system. 
There was no room for the people in the Constituent Assembly negotiations. 
(Interview II)  
 
Furthermore, the Constituent Assembly has been designed to the advantage of the top 
leadership. Both speaking time and the number of seats in the main committee is allocated to 
the representatives with the most votes and those highest in their respective party hierarchies. 
In the end this favors the high caste male leaders. Furthermore, party pressure has been 
hindering the freedom of expression of the assembly members, forcing them to vote 
according to the party position (Tamang 2011, 306-307).   
 
When the Maoists came into government in 2008 new efforts at decentralization were 
introduced. A decentralization reform program was launched, the Local Governance and 
Community Development Programme (LGCDP). Local elections have not been held since 
2002 due to the political instability in the country, and there are thus no elected bodies at the 
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sub-national level. LGCDP was introduced to increase popular participation and 
accountability at the local level. Various committees and organs have been established at the 
village and district level in which ordinary citizens can have a say in the shaping of local 
development policies. Several of my informants in Nepal, both from the local political parties 
and civil society organizations pointed to the problems of patronage and corruption 
penetrating local politics, such as an NGO employee in the district of Makwanpur: “The 
common citizens are related to political parties only through their voting rights, and so the 
parties give them protection in return for their votes. The political parties say: we have to 
protect our supporters.” (Interview X).  	  
5.2 The politics of citizenship 
The analysis of the politics of citizenship enables insight into the construction of power 
relations and the political motives behind the promotion of certain models of state 
organization. Butenschon (2000) referred to two dimensions in the study of the politics of 
citizenship: the constitutional principle of state institutions and the territorial principle of the 
organization of the state. The first dimension concerned whether group affiliation is decisive 
for the status and the rights of each citizen. A distinction was made between singularism, 
pluralism and universalism. The second dimension concerned the territorial organization of 
the state, and the relation between the political/geographical state unit(s) and the demography 
of the population. In this regard we can distinguish between the unitary state, the fragmented 
state and separate states.  
 
In the following section I will place the parties within Buentschon’s typology and show 
movements of the political parties within the framework from democracy was restored in 
1990 and until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 2012. Butenschon (2000) 
emphasizes that it is not necessarily that one regime fits perfectly into one category. The 
same goes for the political parties in Nepal. I nevertheless think it fruitful to place the parties 
according to their dominating views and positions, because in the process of building the 
state and the nation in the multicultural Nepal the dimensions of the typology throw light on 
the political parties’ positions to the issue of political inclusion. I start, therefore, with a brief 
account of the change of the political scene in 2006, which marked the start of a new phase of 
the democratization process in Nepal, encompassing the transition from war to peace, a 
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broadened competitive multiparty democracy as well as efforts at going from a unitary, 
centralized state structure to an inclusive, federal one.   
 
Federalism on the political agenda 
After several failed attempts the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed in 2006 between 
the political parties, ending 10 years of armed conflict. When King Gyanendra in 2005 
attempted to bypass the elected government and gather all state power in his own hands, the 
political parties finally found ground to gather in a joint struggle against the King. Even the 
NC, who since the restoration of democracy in 1990 had been supportive of the constitutional 
monarchy, turned against it. A mass mobilization in the streets of Kathmandu forced the King 
to step down, and Nepal was soon after declared a republic. The Comprehensive Peace 
Accord defined the following goal for Nepal:  
To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state 
by ending the current centralized and unitary form of the state in order to 
address the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous people, Janajatis 
[ethnic groups], Madhesi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and 
backward regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, 
gender, culture, religion and region. (2006, 4) 
 
The popular movement of 2006 was a call for inclusion. The Interim Constitution defined 
Nepal as “an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive and fully democratic 
State” (2007, 1). The restructuring into an inclusive state was thus a set goal, though with no 
further details regarding the kind of restructuring (UNDP 2009, 89). The amendment of the 
Interim Constitution happened fast, without much consultation within or between the parties. 
It was first and foremost to hinder the escalation of the uprising of the Madhesi movement in 
2007. The Madhesis blamed the Interim Government for ignoring previous commitments to 
inclusion of the Madhesi population in the peace agreement (ICG 2007, 18).  
 
Federalism has been proposed by marginalized groups as a solution to ‘the ethnic question’, 
which has been on top of the political agenda since 2006 (Hangen 2010). During the 
Constituent Assembly’s negotiations, however, federalism has turned out to be a contentious 
issue, putting the power balance and influence of the political parties at stake. Mainstream 
actors like the NC and UML, which had not previously been in favor of a federal state 
structure, later tried to back away from federalism. Over the time, it has not been a feasible 
alternative for the NC and UML to draw back on their agreement to federalism. However, the 
form, degree of devolution of power, number of federal states and dividing lines between the 
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states are questions that have been under constant debate. For example, whereas the Maoists 
and MJF want federal states along lines of ethnicity, or identity24, the NC and UML argue for 
federal states primarily based on economic viability (ICG 2012a, 6). 
 
Changes in the politics of citizenship 
As outlined above, after the restoration of democracy in 1990 Nepal was a unitary state. In 
spite of some minor efforts at decentralization, the state remained highly centralized with 
power concentrated in the executive. The majoritarian institutions enabled the domination of 
the high hill Hindu elite. Consequently, women were deprived of inheritance and property 
rights; citizenship was distributed on the basis of descent, thereby excluding large part of the 
population, especially the Madehsi population; laws and norms were underpinned by the 
culture and values of the high hill Hindu caste, such as keeping Nepali as the only official 
language and Hinduism the state religion. Ethnic- and caste-based discrimination was not 
recognized. Along Butenschon’s dimensions this suggests that state- and nation-building was 
underpinned by a singularistic state idea; the state was not relating neutrally to the various 
subgroups within the polity, but rather giving predominance to the high hill Hindu elite. 
Based on the material presented above I would argue that UML to a less degree than the NC 
has pushed for a singularistic state idea. Although UML did not make any firm commitment 
to minorities’ rights during the 1990s, the party did among other things advocate for the 
secularization of the country as well as linguistic equality and some representation rights for 
minorities. The NC, on the other side, was more reluctant to acknowledge group-specific 
identities, seeking to make the various ethnic identities less relevant by focusing on the 
individual equal rights of all the citizens. I would thus argue that while the position of the NC 
from 1990 onwards does not point toward a purely singularistic state idea, it suggests a 
combination of universalism and singularism. UML, on the other hand, promoted a state idea 
with features of both pluralism and singularism. In their policies, the NC and UML were 
therefore to some extent promoting universalism and pluralism respectively. Nevertheless, 
both parties were building a state with features consistent with a singularistic state idea, 
designing a system that built the hegemonic position of the high hill Hindu elite.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The parties have gradually come to talk of identity-based federalism rather than ethnic-based federalism, to 
proceed beyond ethnicity and also take into consideration factors such as language and culture. However, the 
content of the proposed models remain the same.  
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After peace was restored in 2006, there has been a clearer divide in the paths taken by the NC 
and UML. In the meeting with contentious identity politics and ethnic claims, the NC has 
resorted more to the principle of universalism. This is first and foremost evident in the NC’s 
reluctance to provide group-specific rights to marginalized and excluded groups in the 
society, arguing that individual rights is more efficient to ensure the equality of everyone, and 
that who should be counted as excluded should depend on poverty and not ethnicity (ICG 
2012a). UML, on the other hand, suddenly embarked on special group rights for marginalized 
groups. 
 
Moreover, with respect to the structure of the state both the NC and UML have agreed on the 
dissolution of the unitary state and the restructuring into a federal state, but in some aspect 
they differ from each other. Given the different approaches of the parties with regard to the 
constitutional principle, with the UML taking a pluralistic approach whereas the NC pursues 
a more universal approach, I will therefore suggest that the UML falls into the category of 
cantonization, whereas the NC falls into the category of federation/confederation.  
 
The Maoists and MJF, on the other hand, have been the two actors advocating the strongest 
for federalization. They advocate for the rights of the various ethnic groups for a stronger 
decentralized level, while the role of the center is to facilitate compromise between all 
groups. This corresponds to pluralism as the state idea. With regard to the Maoists there has 
not been any change in their position within the typology. Since they launched the insurgency 
in 1996 they have been advocating for a fragmented state on the basis of pluralism; 
recognizing different ethnic identities, but not giving predominance to any of these. This 
suggests that both UCPN(M) and MJF fall into the category of cantonization.  	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To sum up the empirical observations, I suggest the following placement (and movements) of 
NC, UML, UCPN(M) and MJF in the typology: 	  
Table 2: Dynamics in the political organization of state territories  
Constitutional 
Principle 
Territorial 
Principles 
  
 
 The Unitary State The Fragmented State Separate 
Territories 
Singularism Hegemonic system  
 
Imposed self-rule Ethnic 
“Homelands” 
 
Pluralism Consociational 
systems 
 
 
Cantonization  
Unified  
Marxist-Leninist (UML) 
 
UCPN(Maoist)  
 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) 
 
Separate 
states 
Universalism Majoritarian 
systems 
 
Federation/Confederation 
Nepali Congress (NC) 
 
Separate 
states 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Citizenship policies of inclusion and exclusion 
The identification of the political parties’ positions in the typology above shows that there 
have been changes in the politics of citizenship, and seemingly more agreement on how to go 
about to build a more inclusive state. Throughout the empirical inquiry I have discussed the 
political parties’ positions in regard to the four dimensions of citizenship: membership, legal 
status, rights and participation. The account shows that citizenship in Nepal after the 
restoration of democracy in 1990 has remained limited in regard to all four dimensions.  
 
Membership in relation to the state as the political community has been founded on a 
construction of nationhood built on the values and lifestyle of one ethnic group in Nepal, the 
high hill Hindu caste, and is thus discriminating to other ethnic groups. This definition of 
Nepali, that has been protected by the NC and the UML, is challenged by the Maoists and 
Madhesi activism. These movements have been successful in raising the issue of ethnic 
inclusion. Citizenship as a legal status has been, and still is, a source of political exclusion. 
First, because the provision of citizenship until 2006 only went through fathers’ lineage; 
second, although there is now a gender neutral provision (citizenship certificates are given 
both through father and mother), the implementation of the act is still discriminating against 
	  	  UML	  	  
	  UML	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  NC	  	  
	  	  	  NC	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women; and third, the NC and UML stick to keeping jus sanguinis (citizenship through 
descent) as the main principle for granting citizenship, which makes it difficult for certain 
groups, especially the Madhesi population, to obtain citizenship certificates.  
 
The substance and extension of citizenship rights have similarly to membership largely 
benefitted the high-hill Hindu caste. The embracement of individual rights in the 1990 
Constitution served the purpose of keeping the state apparatus dominated by the high hill 
Hindu elite, and the NC and UML’s approach to social and cultural rights has been little more 
than lip-service. The UML has in recent years reached out to the marginalized groups, but has 
again shown little commitment to this agenda. The Maoists and MJF, on the other hand, have 
advocated for special representation rights for ethnic groups and self-determination rights. 
The former was a central contribution to the election of a Constituent Assembly that was 
more representative than any other state institution in Nepal. To what extent special group 
rights actually fosters inclusion will be discussed more thoroughly in the analysis. Especially 
when it concerns the Madhesi claims, there is reason to question the inclusive potential of 
giving special rights to one group in the multicultural and multi-ethnic Tarai region. The 
issue of political self-determination rights is left unsolved. Social rights came to the center of 
the agenda when the Maoists came to government, but for some reason it did not translate 
into actual policies. The Maoists and MJF further claim official status and use of other 
languages than Nepali, but to this day this has not been agreed upon.  
 
In terms of participation, the spaces for exercising citizenship rights after the restoration of 
democracy in 1990 were to a large extent limited to national elections. The state remained 
highly exclusive and centralized. In contrast to the top-down provided channels for 
participation and representation, the Maoist and Madhesi movements represented strong 
forces that utilized new strategies and demanded, from below, spaces for political 
participation. The Interim Constitution, which provided for the election of a constituent 
assembly with the mandate to draft the new constitution as well as the restructuring into a 
federal state, was therefore an important achievement for these movements. The results, 
however, in terms of inclusive policies, remain limited. The negotiations in the Constituent 
Assembly quickly turned an elite-led business, and the boundaries between the federal states 
remained a contested issue until the assembly was dissolved in May 2012. What at first sight 
were promising moves toward an inclusive process and radical transformation of the state did 
not translate into inclusionary policies. There is still social and political exclusion.  
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The political parties’ positions and movements in Butenschon’s typology seen in relation to 
the character of the demands and results of their citizenship policies are summarized in the 
following table. The table shows whether the demands and results in the parties’ policies over 
time have fostered inclusion or exclusion. 	  
Table 3: The politics of citizenship Political	  organization	  of	  state	  territories	   Policies:	  inclusion/exclusion	  (demands	  and	  results)	  	  	   Membership	   Legal	  status	  	   Rights	   Participation	  NC	  From	  hegemonic/	  majoritarian	  system	  to	  federation/	  confederation	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	  	   Continuing	  ethnic	  and	  gender	  exclusion	   Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	   Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	  	  
UML	  	  From	  hegemonic/	  consociational	  system	  to	  cantonization	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	   Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion,	  but	  gender	  inclusion	  
Increasing	  inclusionary	  demands,	  but	  poor	  results:	  continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  exclusion	  
UCPN(M)	  Cantonization	  (no	  change)	  	  	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  inclusion	  	  	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  and	  gender	  inclusion	  	  
Inclusionary	  demands	  but	  mixed	  results	   Inclusionary	  demands	  but	  exclusionary	  results	  MJF	  Cantonization	  	  	  (new	  actor,	  no	  change)	  	  	  
Continuing	  ethnic	  inclusion	   Continuing	  ethnic	  inclusion,	  gender	  exclusion	   Inclusionary	  demands	  but	  mixed	  results	   Inclusionary	  demands	  but	  exclusionary	  result	  	  	  
To sum up, the table shows that the NC and UML have largely remained exclusionary with 
regard to all four dimensions. Their changing positions in regard to the organization of the 
state, that is when they agreed on federalization, have not corresponded with substantial 
changes in their citizenship policies. Although the UML has raised more inclusionary 
demands (and pursue gender inclusion in regard to citizenship as a legal status), as accounted 
for above, the results remain limited. When it comes to the Maoists and MJF, there is no 
change in their positions in the typology but there have been changes in the content of their 
policies, from the demands they raised to actual results. The Maoists and MJF have been 
successful in raising the issue of inclusion on the political agenda, challenging the high caste 
Hindu elite-dominated state. Their policies for fostering inclusion through rights and 
participation have contained demands for ethnic inclusion. However, the results have been 
poor – there has been little substantive change. At best, the results have been mixed: the 
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rights to political representation have been implemented, but social, economic and cultural 
rights remain absent. Participation has remained an elite-business.  
 
5.3 Summing up 
Throughout this chapter I have described basic elements of the content and conflicts 
surrounding citizenship in Nepal, with discussions on membership in relation to the state, 
legal status, rights and political participation. I have highlighted the issues within the four 
dimensions of citizenship that have been the most contested among the political parties in the 
period from the restoration of democracy in 1990 and until the Maoists had launched their 
insurgency in 1996, and from peace was restored in 2006 and until the dissolution of the 
Constituent Assembly in 2012. 
 
The above account shows that after the restoration of democracy in 1990 citizenship has 
remained limited in regard to all four dimensions. Social and political exclusion prevails. The 
attempts at fostering inclusion have not produced substantial results. What explains the 
failure of the Maoists and MJF in producing inclusionary politics when they entered electoral 
politics and came into a position where they could build an alternative? And why have the 
traditional parties remained exclusionary? These questions will be addressed in the following 
chapter as I set out to investigate the parties’ options and strategies in popular mobilization. 	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6 Analysis 	  
The previous chapter concluded that the recent political developments in Nepal have not led 
to more inclusion. I have identified the period of 2006-2008 as a turning point when it comes 
to the political parties’ relations to the politics of citizenship. These changes relate to new 
structural and institutional conditions in the process of democratization, from the need to 
demand democratization to more opportunity for practicing and further developing 
democracy. Having placed the political parties in Butenschon’s typology of the political 
organization of the state and distinguishing its relation to the content of the policies, I made 
the following three points: in the case of the NC and UML’s declarations there have been 
changes in position within the typology which correspond to the new chances of practicing 
and developing democracy, but few changes in terms of the parties’ actual policies. In short, 
the NC and UML largely remain exclusionary. With regard to the Maoists, by contrast, the 
altered conditions have not produced substantive changes within the typology – they still 
focus on interests of subordinated groups. But as in the case of the NC and UML the policies 
have not really fostered more inclusion. Lastly, MJF entered the electoral arena because of 
dissatisfaction with the agenda and actions of the Maoists as well as the NC and UML. The 
question I want to address in the remaining part of the thesis is: What explains the lack of 
more inclusionary policies?  
 
6.1 The framework of popular mobilization 
In order to answer this question I use a framework developed by Törnquist et al. 
(forthcoming) that instructs us to consider three aspects to understand changes in attempts at 
inclusionary politics25: The building of political communities (i.e. collectivities that have 
political ideas and interests in common), the type and character of rights that are given 
priority by these collectivities and the channels of political representation that they give 
priority to. With the changing political context in 2006, when the Maoists resumed 
parliamentary politics and peace was still fragile, the political parties then faced a wide range 
of demands from a politically mobilized electorate which produced more identity politics. 
Many people demanded their recognition and equality and were afraid of being ignored once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The framework is developed in order to analyse problems and options of transformative politics to enable the 
combination of equality and economic development. The three dimensions seem to be crucial irrespective of 
context and type of transformative politics. 
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again. Did the changing circumstances lead to a change in the building of political 
communities, the type of rights and channels of representation the actors opted for? In the 
following, I will analyze the parties’ agendas in regard to these three aspects and discuss if 
any changes in their prioritizations over time may explain the relative lack of more inclusive 
policies.  
 
6.1.1 Building political communities 
To study the building of political communities includes an analysis of the content and the 
form; that is what the groups have in common and how they mobilize and organize. The aim 
is to identify whether there have been any changes in these two dimensions over time. While 
political integration refers to the inclusion of people on a relatively equal basis, often via 
broad and autonomous popular organizations, political incorporation is based on inclusion of 
less organized masses into politics, either through clientelistic relations or populist 
mechanisms (Törnquist 2002, 39). Political incorporation may include aspects of both 
populism and clientelism. I therefore focus on the mode of integration versus incorporation 
the actors have given priority to over time. 
 
Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 
The empirical inquiry showed that the NC since the restoration of democracy in 1990 has 
been concerned with promoting the values and culture of the high hill Hindu caste. This was, 
among other things, seen in the process of drafting the 1990 Constitution. As described in 
chapter 5, the NC leadership had a strong influence on the process and managed to assert the 
domination of the ‘Nepali identity’ by introducing laws and institutions built on the values 
and culture of the high hill Hindu caste, such as keeping Nepali as the only official language 
and Hinduism as the state religion. What the political community has in common is first and 
foremost an identity. The representation of a constituency on the basis of a common identity 
or culture is what Pitkin (1967) classifies as symbolic representation. Although pluralism was 
recognized in the 1990 Constitution, the national discourse was centered on the unity of the 
Nepali people, calling to mind the previous Panchayat homogenization process, which sought 
to integrate the different ethnic and cultural groups rather than acknowledging their cultural 
specificities.  
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UML has been associated to the high caste alongside the NC. The party has expressed that it 
believes in the unity and harmony among all people of Nepal, irrespective of religion, 
ethnicity and caste. Seeking to raise the issues and interests of various groups, this, in Pitkin’s 
(1967) terms, refers to substantive representation. The party’s slogans in the 1990s typically 
sounded: “food, housing and clothing for all”, “land to the tillers”, “confiscation of land from 
landlords”, “uplifting poor, women, and other disadvantaged groups” (Gellner 2008, 159). 
The empirical material presented above indicates that the party has been more concerned with 
securing the interests of the high caste rather than promoting the interests of the marginalized 
groups, though the party itself claims to represent the least well off. This was clearly seen in 
the aftermath of the restoration of democracy in 1990, when UML publicly made efforts to 
raise the issues of marginalized groups while the actual policies they pursued benefited the 
high caste.  
 
As previously stated, patronage politics was a central element for both the NC and UML 
throughout the 1990s in order to enhance their electoral base. Devolution of power to the sub-
national level remained limited, and local strongmen thrived in their patronage networks. 
Such top-down relations in the political mobilization and organization, that is, when the 
political community is formed behind a patron, is what Mouzelis (1998) refers to as the 
incorporative-clientelistic mode of political integration. The form of the political community 
of both the NC and UML were primarily patronage-based politics. This requests strong 
middlemen. The NC built alliances with the former elite of the Panchayat system, allowing 
the local elites to maintain their privileges, while they in return could assure the electorate’s 
support for the NC (Brown 1996, 175). The patronage networks of UML were based on the 
party cadres, who each had their clientelistic networks to sustain. As both the NC and UML’s 
popularity during the 1990s decreased among the electorate in line with their poor 
performance in government, they increasingly became reliant on the patronage networks to 
get votes (Gellner 2008, 154). 
 
The election manifesto of the NC in 2008 stated that the Constituent Assembly was an 
opportunity to rebuild “we, the people of Nepal” (ICG 2008a, 3). Furthermore, in current 
debates on federalization, the main argument of the NC is that identity-based federalism 
poses a threat to the unity of Nepal and the national integration. The president of the NC, 
Sushil Koirala, has expressed: “Nepali Congress will never accept an ethnic-based 
federalism. This federalism will ruin Nepal’s unity and stability.” (New Spotlight Nepal 
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2012) The strong stand the NC takes against any form of identity-based federalism, in 
addition to their reluctance to acknowledge group rights, indicate that it is still the ‘Nepali 
identity’ that unites the political community.  
 
In the case of UML, the content of the political community is still based on issues and 
interests also post 2006. The empirical material indicates that it to a large extent is the same 
story that has repeated itself: UML reaching out to the marginalized groups in an attempt to 
broaden the political base, to then withdraw on the commitments made and rather prioritize 
the interests of the high caste. This is most evident in the debate on federalism, and it has led 
to some divisions within the party, primarily between the ethnic leaders who opt for identity-
based federalism, and the high caste Hindu top leadership who resist it (ICG 2012a, 7). 
Though there has not been any explicit change in the content of the political community over 
time, the somewhat fragmented content may explain the party’s staggering position on the 
issue of identity-based federalism. UML tries to keep a foot in both camps. This may explain 
the UML’s failure to foster more inclusionary policies. The political inclusion of the masses 
still primarily goes through clientelistic networks, both on the part of the NC and UML (ICG 
2008b, 2010). Without the commitment from the top it is difficult to foster change. Given 
that the form of political mobilization is based in top-down incorporation, the likelihood of 
the marginalized groups’ agenda winning prominence over that of the Hindu elite remains 
rather weak. To sum up the case of the NC, there have not been major changes in the building 
of the political community since 1990 until today. It is built on the high hill Hindu identity 
and is embedded within patronage politics. As outlined in the empirical chapter, this has 
previously resulted in sustained political and social exclusion in Nepal. The lack of change 
suggests that fostering more inclusive politics will not be on the agenda of the NC. 
 
The Maoists 
The Maoist strategy of mobilization is one of the main reasons behind the upsurge of identity 
and ethnic politics in Nepal. As was discussed in the empirical inquiry, the Maoists first and 
foremost came together on the basis of common interests of socio-economic and political 
inclusion among many subordinated groups. It was the claims for improved livelihood and a 
more equal and fair society that brought the subordinated groups together, due to their shared 
experience of socio-economic marginalization from the state and century-long domination by 
the Hindu elite, which had resulted in poverty and extreme levels of inequality. To abolish 
the feudal system required broad alliances and mobilization cutting across caste and ethnic 
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divides. More than that, they were also united by their common ideology and strategy: to 
overthrow the government and capture state-power. The content was thus, similar to UML, 
on the basis of substantive representation: issues and interests relating to socio-economic 
equality, as well as the strategy of capturing state power through an armed revolution. 
 
Throughout the insurgency, the ethnic and regional fronts established across the country 
came to be more central to the organization of the Maoist movement. Most of the party’s 
leadership was underground (Sharma 2004, 40). While the Maoist army, People’s Liberation 
Army, was conducting underground guerilla warfare, the leaders of the front organizations 
had a crucial role in mobilizing support to the Maoist movement within their respective 
regions (ICG 2005, 11; 2007, 7). These leaders enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, and served 
as mediating links between the top leadership and the popular masses. As the Maoist 
movement grew larger and more complex in terms of the mobilization of various ethnic 
groups, the ethnic leaders became increasingly important to the organization of the 
movement. Along the lines of Mouzelis (1998), this shows that the organization and 
mobilization of the political community have taken the form of patronage politics. The local 
communist leaders in the districts functioned as party bosses, whom based on their 
organizational clout could provide protection for their specific groups and individuals in 
return for their support. Similar to the patron-clientelism of the NC and UML, the party-
bossism is a method to incorporate people into politics, as opposite to the integrative mode, 
that is, when people become involved with politics by way of their own organizations.  
 
Then what about the political community post 2006? In the case of the Maoists, have there 
been any changes? The Maoists at this point resumed parliamentary politics. Choosing to lay 
down their weapons and join electoral politics obviously had implications for the 
movement’s strategy. When the King stepped down and the country became a democratic 
republic, the Maoists had won over their main enemy26. Remaining were the political parties, 
the NC and the UML, with whom the Maoists then went into electoral competition. The 
demands for socio-economic equality thus no longer took the form of a struggle toward the 
state since the Maoists now formed part of the state apparatus. Moreover, the Comprehensive 
Peace Accord and the following Interim Constitution also provided for two of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 After the royal massacre in 2001, the Maoists declared the monarchy to be the prime enemy. Previously it had 
not been a pronounced goal to abolish the monarchy per se, only to strip it of all special privileges (Dhungel 
2007, 14-15). 
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longstanding claims of the Maoists: the election of a constituent assembly with the mandate 
to draft the country’s new constitution and the restructuring of the state27. The latter would 
turn out to be a contentious issue. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, for the Maoists, 
this is a question of how to secure inclusion and self-determination rights for the various 
ethnic groups. This indicates a change in the content of the political community. Whereas it 
was previously united on the basis of the people’s common interests and claims for socio-
economic equality directed toward the state, the priority came to be interests relating to 
political rights, more specifically, claims for identity-based federalism. The disagreement on 
what federal model to pursue was what finally led to the dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly before it had agreed on a draft constitution, as neither of the parties seemed willing 
to compromise too much. The Maoists had been the prime force demanding for the election 
of a constituent assembly, and they were in the end standing left as the prime actor 
responsible for the failure to reach agreement. It was the Maoists who had everything to lose 
by not producing a draft constitution. Why would they let this happen?  
 
One explanation relates to the changing content of the political community. When the 
movement was previously united around the claims for socio-economic equality and a 
common strategy of overthrowing the government and capturing state power, this allowed for 
building unity across ethnic and cultural divides. Then, once in state power, keeping the 
political community united would necessarily be more difficult. As the major party in the 
Constituent Assembly, expectations were high for what the Maoists would achieve. But, as 
was discussed in chapter 4, they have not been able to deliver on their promises and translate 
the socio-economic agenda into actual policies that empower the subordinated groups. 
Moreover, the specific groups within the broad Maoist base have become more concerned 
with securing their own interests. The case of the Madhesi activists breaking out from the 
Maoist movement demonstrates this challenge. While MJF, who was in the lead of the 
Madhesi movement, claimed one large Madhes state covering the whole Tarai region, the 
Maoists had recognized a separate state for the Tharus (indigenous people) (Gayer and 
Jaffrelot 2009, 59). This is one of the reasons for why the Madhesi movement took a stand 
away from the Maoist movement to focus on their own objectives. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Both these claims had been included in the 40 points demand that was handed over to the government prior to 
the insurgency. 
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These challenges must be seen in relation to the form of mobilization and organization. When 
the Maoists resumed electoral politics, they were no longer dependent solely on popular 
support for their activities, but they needed votes. They expanded the political constituency 
by further recruiting to the fraternal organizations across the country. For this purpose they 
would naturally be more dependent on the local patrons whom provided the mediating links 
between the party and the electorate. Their mobilization was an important factor contributing 
to the Maoists winning the election in 2008, as other parties were mainly Kathmandu-based 
and lacked organizational presence in the districts. This type of mobilization again requests 
that they actually deliver on the issues and the interests of the various groups they have 
mobilized. Such a simplistic democracy can generate more claims, as was the case with the 
Madhesi movement that resulted in political uprising and increasing ethno-nationalism on the 
part of the Madhesi population.  
 
In the end, identity politics has increased; each group is concerned with their own rights. This 
development partly gives support to Mansfield and Snyder’s (2007) argument that the 
challenges and problems of the democratic transition in 1990 that first led to the Maoist 
insurgency has also left negative legacies for the later attempts at democratization in that it 
has produced more conflicts along ethnic and cultural lines. However, escalation of violence 
has been absent after the government met the Madhesi movement’s demands in regard to the 
amendment of the Interim Constitution.  
 
The political community that was built during the insurgency seems to have become more 
fragmented when the Maoists resumed parliamentary politics because they were expected to 
deliver on the specific interests of the various groups. The question then is what kind of 
democratic reforms and interests the Maoists have chosen to prioritize, whether it is the 
overall interests of the party or the specific interests of the group leaders and party bosses. I 
will come back to this issue in the sub-chapters concerning the prioritization of rights and 
channels of representation. 
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Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal 
‘Pahadis out of Madhesh’ and ‘down with hill administration’28. These were central slogans 
of the Madhesi uprising in Tarai in 2007 (Hachhethu 2007a, 3). This points directly to the 
content of the Madhesi movement: their Madhesi identity, as separate from other Nepalese in 
regard to their culture and language, and especially in opposition to the population of the 
middle hills. It is the Madhesi ethnic identity that lies at the core of their collective struggle. 
After the amendment of the Interim Constitution, Vijay Karna, a Madhesi activist, celebrated 
the achievement:  
It gives Madhesh a separate identity; it produces federalism; it compels the 
state to increase representation of the Madhesh in the state apparatus; it helps 
Madheshis to get citizenship card without much pain; and above all it boosts 
up morale and confidence of the Madheshi people. (cited in Hachhethu 2007a, 
3) 
  
Madhesi activism prior to 2007 had mainly revolved around claims for inclusion in state 
institutions and control over national resources, and having its base in the regional identity of 
the Tarai population. As noted in the empirical inquiry, the Madhesi population was initially 
mobilized by the Maoists. In 2000 they established a Maoist front organization in the Madhes 
region, the Madhesh National Liberation Front. The slogan was: “say it with pride, we are 
Madhesi” (Hachhethu 2007a, 7). The Madhesi movement and the MJF later took on this 
agenda. Regional based ethno-nationalism thus came to the center of the Madhesi movement 
and the MJF (Hachhethu 2007a). Descriptive representation is at the core of the political 
community, the leaders representing the Madhesi community on the basis of their ethnic 
identity.  
 
The political mobilization in MJF is heavily reliant on caste-based politics (ICG 2007, 
2012b). As elaborated upon in the empirical inquiry, a large number of hill migrants settled in 
the Tarai region during the Panchayat era as part of the system’s assimilation strategy. The 
hill people were privileged by the state, and gained a leading position at the cost of the 
traditional Tarai landlords. However, due to the feudal relationships between the landowners 
and the landless, the local elites retained a great share of informal power. MJF has been led 
by one of the traditional landowner castes, the Yadavs, who could easily mobilize the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 ‘Pahadis’ is a term referring to the hill population. On a north-south transection there are three geographical 
zones in Nepal: The mountains, the hills and the plains. The Tarai region comprises the plains.  
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landless low castes (Hatlebakk 2007). The form of the political community of MJF is thus 
similar to the NC, UML and the Maoists’, primarily based on patronage politics.      
 
6.1.2 Rights 
Given the political communities that are established and organized, the next question for 
analysis concerns the type of rights the actors opt for and the character of these rights. Similar 
to above, I look into which rights have dominated the agenda over time to see if I can identify 
any changes.   
 
Nepali Congress 
As was outlined in the empirical inquiry, since the restoration of democracy in 1990 the NC 
has focused on individual rights. This was clearly expressed in the 1990 Constitution, which 
almost exclusively came to recognize individual rights. The constitution drafting 
commission, under heavy influence by the NC, ignored popular demands for group-specific 
rights29. These were rather seen as a threat to national unity (Hutt 1991, 1028). In line with 
the NC promoting itself as the only party genuinely fostering democracy, civil and political 
rights were high on the agenda. They protected private property rights, warning that the 
communist parties “would confiscate all private property” (Whelpton 1994, 64). Political 
equality was, rhetorically, high on the agenda, but, as seen, it did not translate into policies 
addressing the imbalance of political participation in Nepal.  
 
The principle of universality that the NC has embraced and, consequently, the neglect of 
group-specific rights, can be seen as a logical step in the ruling elite’s effort toward 
maintaining their dominant position in the political field; in the state apparatus specifically, 
and in the Nepali society in general. Given the limited participation of other ethnic and 
cultural groups on the political arena, the domination in state institutions enabled the NC to 
implement their own values and norms in the policies (Lawoti 2007b). According to Young 
(2011), ignoring group-specific identities is a form of oppression by the ruling group. 
Neglecting group rights and focusing on promoting the unity of Nepal, which is built on the 
culture, values and norms of the high hill Hindu caste, is a logical approach given the content 
of the political community, and as identified above, its built identity of the high hill Hindu 
caste.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The exception was some educational and health rights for backward and marginalized groups. 
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After 2006 there have not been major changes in NC’s position with regards to rights. They 
have been hesitant to acknowledge structural discrimination in society, arguing that 
inequality has economic basis, and that policy addressing ethnic discrimination harm 
individual rights (ICG 2012a). In a multicultural society with long traditions of exclusion and 
marginalization of various ethnic groups, this position has so far not generated political and 
social inclusion. Keeping the country’s identity and unity is a central issue to the NC, 
explicitly seen in its reluctance to acknowledge identity-based federalism, but also in the 
question of distribution of citizenship. The empirical material pointing to the NC, along with 
UML, advocates for maintaining citizenship by descent as the main principle for distributing 
citizenship. Providing citizenship on the basis of descent, as seen, historically has been a 
major cause of exclusion, especially harming the Madhesis. The NC and UML’s reluctance to 
provide citizenship to a larger share of the Madhesi population may be understood as a part 
of the strategy to maintain the ‘Nepali identity’, and, to limit the challenges to their 
dominating position. This was also pointed to by one of my informants from the Maoist 
party: “The groups from the hill region [the NC and UML] see every Madhesi as Indian. 
Because they speak the same languages on both sides of the border. That is why they 
discriminate against the Madhesis.” (Interview VIII)  
 
Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 
The empirical inquiry showed that UML advocated for minorities’ rights during the 
democratic movement in 1990 and in the years following the restoration of multiparty 
democracy by raising issues of linguistic and religious equality as well as political rights 
relating to minorities’ representation in the state apparatus. It seems safe to conclude that this 
was primarily an effort to increase the electoral base. The empirical chapter showed the 
policies the party pursued during the 1990s suggest a rather weak commitment to these 
issues. Examples include the party’s quick acceptance of Hinduism as the state religion, and 
their decision to introduce Sanskrit news broadcast on the state-owned national radio station 
when in government from 1994-1995 (ICG 2012b, 19). In the above I identified the political 
community of UML to be built primarily on the interests of the high hill Hindu elite. This can 
explain why the party is not delivering on the promises made to ethnic and other minorities, 
as they, along with the NC, benefitted from the universal approach to rights that was 
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embraced in the 1990 Constitution. It contributed to sustaining their dominance on the 
political arena.  
 
UML’s lack of commitment to ethnic and marginalized groups’ rights led many of the 
concerned groups who had earlier supported UML to embrace the Maoist agenda of inclusion 
and socio-economic equality. During the peace process that started in 2006, UML again 
reached out to ethnic and marginalized groups by putting minority rights high on the agenda, 
advocating for representation rights for marginalized groups in state institutions and 
endorsing regional and ethnic autonomy. Prior to this, the NC and UML had to a large extent 
been unchallenged on the political arena. There is reason to assume that this renewed 
commitment came as a result of the rising identity politics and new political actors, first and 
foremost the Maoists, but later also MJF and other Madhesi-based parties, entering the 
electoral field. UML was left situated between a conservative NC and the radical force the 
Maoists represented.  
 
After 2006 there has been internal division in UML in relation to the party’s position in the 
question of ethnic and minority groups’ rights. On the one hand, the party has advocated for 
group-specific rights to protect the minorities, for example by endorsing the ILO Convention 
169 concerning the protection of indigenous and tribal rights and support of indigenous 
cultures, including the right to self-determination. On the other hand, when it concerns 
federalism, UML has proved rather indecisive; from fully endorsing identity-based 
federalism in 2006 and including it in their party manifesto for the election in 2008, to later 
drawing back on their stand. During the negotiations in the Constituent Assembly it became 
increasingly apparent that UML would not support identity-based federalism after all (2012a, 
b). The arguments more frequently sounded that this would create communal tensions and 
threaten the unity of Nepal (ICG 2012b, 18-19). This led to discontent among the ethnic 
leaders who had initially believed this had been a sincere commitment from UML, but came 
to learn that it was not.  “Many leaders from Nepali Congress and UML joined our party as 
they felt their Madhesi community was disrespected in their party. They could not come up 
with any decision regarding federalism and giving rights to Madhesi, and that is why they 
came to our party.” (Interview VIII)  
 
One explanation to UML’s staggering position in the question of group rights can be found 
by looking closer into the different types of group-specific rights. Kymlicka (1995, 27-33) 
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made a distinction between self-government rights to minorities within the state, polyethnic 
rights to protect minorities’ rights and culture, and special representation rights to secure 
minorities’ representation in state institutions. The purpose of the two latter types of rights is 
to integrate the minorities into the existing polity while securing the groups’ cultural identity, 
whereas self-government rights are challenging the definition of the political community. 
Identity-based federalism belongs to the latter category. Granting such rights to the ethnic 
minorities would most probably challenge UML’s position in the state apparatus. UML, 
along with NC, would clearly have an interest in maintaining the status quo. On the other 
hand, supporting special representation rights for minorities in state institutions, a promise 
UML never abandoned, is a much less ‘dangerous’ affaire. It may seem as though the 
fragmented content of the political community has translated into hesitancy in the politics of 
rights. As the interests of the elites have maintained prominence, so have the type of rights 
that are more likely to secure their dominant position. This may have contributed to the lack 
of inclusive politics, both in terms of UML as an actor of change, as well as a force hindering 
other actors’ attempts at fostering inclusion.  
 
The Maoists 
A demand for socio-economic and political self-determination rights was at the core of the 
Maoist movement when they launched the insurgency in 1996. In the above, I established 
that the political community at the time of the insurgency was built on claims for socio-
economic equality as well as the strategy of capturing state power through an armed 
revolution and establish a communist state. The Maoists saw the right to political self-
determination as a necessary means to eradicate socio-economic inequality. 
 
Although socio-economic rights have been high on the agenda in the rhetoric of UCPN(M) 
also after they came to power in 2008, the empirical inquiry showed that outcome in terms of 
actual policies remains to be seen. Looking into what the Maoists have achieved, there seems 
to have been a shift in the prioritization of rights. The Maoists succeeded in securing 
representation rights to Dalits, peasants, women, Madhesi, ethnic groups and Muslims, in 
addition to special protection rights to highly marginalized and endangered communities. 
This indicates that after UCPN(M) came to power, the socio-economic rights have come 
secondary to political rights. Moreover, the fact that disagreement on the issue of identity-
based federalism led to the dissolution of the assembly before it had agreed on a draft 
constitution, points to the emphasis the Maoists have put on political rights. As elaborated 
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upon above, they had everything to lose by not producing a draft constitution. This indicates 
that the issue of identity-based federalism was too important to let go. Given the fragmented 
community, delivering on these rights would be important to maintain the electoral base. 
Although the Maoists see changes in political institutions as a means to an all-encompassing 
transformation of the socio-economic structures in the country, a shift in the priority of rights 
is nevertheless there. This needs to be seen in relation to the Maoist change of strategy. 
Whereas the goal previously had been to capture state power and build a communist state, 
entering into electoral politics and accepting parliamentary democracy as the rules of the 
game, their new strategy has been to secure access to political decision-making institutions 
for the marginalized groups, which constitute their main political base. Furthermore, the 
debate on the dividing lines between the federal states is after all a question of how to secure 
the interests and the electoral grip on power for the respective parties, not least so for the 
Maoists.  
 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal 
A political community built on the Madhesi identity, a population group with a long history 
of marginalization and exclusion from the Nepali state, naturally has advocated for group-
specific rights. When the Interim Constitution was amended accordingly to Madhesi claims 
for federalism and a number of electoral seats in the Constituent Assembly proportional to 
the population in the Tarai region, the Madhesi movement had won an important victory with 
regard to the recognition of their marginalization. The focus of MJF was then toward the 
federalization of the state, strongly advocating for an identity-based federal model. They 
originally demanded one Madhesh province to encompass the whole Tarai region, with the 
slogan ‘one state, one Madhesh’, arguing that one state would be stronger in relation to the 
center30 (Dahal 2010, 2013; Hachhethu 2007a, 11). MJF claim political self-determination 
rights are necessary to counter the discrimination by the hill population and the extraction of 
rich resources from their region (Tamang 2011, 302).  
 
Group rights versus universal rights - potential for inclusion? 
Whether it is a model focusing on group-specific rights or a universal approach to rights that 
has most potential of fostering political and social inclusion in Nepal remains undetermined. 
What is certain is the universal approach that has previously been pursued has not fostered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 MJF later compromised on two states in the Tarai region. 
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inclusion. It supports the arguments of Kymlicka (1995) and Young (2011) that the universal 
approach and the denial of group rights enable group oppression and upholds group 
inequality. This has led to the renewed focus on group-rights in Nepal. As one of my 
informants from a civil society perspective observed: “Nowadays there is much concern 
about group rights, not so much about individual rights or human rights. Group rights are the 
most important in identity politics. It is not fostering the idea of equal citizenship or national 
identity.” (Interview II) The argument that group rights may institutionalize difference, and 
that it may hinder the equal exercise of citizenship rights, is a valid objection in the case of 
Nepal too. One illustration of this problem concerns a quota bill that was proposed by 
Madhesi parties in 2012, suggesting to increase the quota for marginalized communities in 
state institution from 45 to 48 percent. The high caste was unhappy because various groups 
had their own quotas, while they were merely in the category of ‘others’. Marginalized 
communities were dissatisfied on the other side because their quota would leave the ‘open 
category’ only for the upper-caste candidates (ICG 2012a, 7-8).  
 
MJF was initially seen as a possible game-changer in the making of a more inclusive state. 
However, the party has remained focused on the rights of the Madhesi population only, with 
its single-issue agenda of identity-based federalism. As pointed to above, the composition of 
the population in the Tarai region is complex, consisting of various ethnic, religious and 
cultural groups. The potential of the claims of MJF actually fostering inclusion in this context 
is dubious. Furthermore, there is a question of heterogeneity in interests and needs also 
within the various groups. For example, the caste system of the Madhesi population implies a 
strict hierarchy in which the Dalits remain heavily subordinated. When the Madhesi 
population as a whole is defined as marginalized and given special representation rights, it is 
not given that the high caste Madhesi leaders (who are often the people with most capacities 
to participate in politics) would represent the interests of the Madhesi Dalits (Hatlebakk 
2007). As pointed to by one of my informants, it is apparent the same is also true when roles 
are reversed: “Many organizations in the far west have programs for Dalits, but among the 
Dalits there was one upper caste Chettri, and all the Dalits were given toilets [but] in his 
house it was not constructed.” (Interview II).  
 
The provision of group rights may be necessary for the disadvantaged groups who until now, 
have been excluded from the democratic system. However, if they are not oriented toward 
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rendering possible the equal exercise of citizenship rights, that is the universal civil, political 
and social rights, it may lead to the institutionalization of difference and competition among 
the various groups to secure their own rights.  
 
6.1.3 Representation 
The third element of the framework of popular mobilization requests investigation into two 
areas. Given the content of the political community; what channels of representation do the 
actors choose and what is the form of mediation? In other words, where do the actors go with 
the issues they want to raise and how do they go about doing so. How are they legitimized 
and authorized? Similar to the analysis above, I seek to identify whether there have been any 
changes in the channels and mediating links the parties used before and the channels they are 
using now. 
 
Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (UML) 
As outlined in chapter 5, the institutions that were developed after the restoration of 
democracy in 1990 benefitted the NC and UML in terms of securing their dominance on the 
political arena. Introducing the first-past-the-post electoral system and gathering all powers in 
the executive facilitated single-party control, and the parties were able to introduce policies in 
their favor. Banning ethnic- or non-Hindu parties hindered the electoral competition from 
potentially challenging forces.  
 
As pointed to in the empirical inquiry, the democratic competition in post 1990 Nepal was 
largely based on the parties’ abilities to feed their patronage networks. The access to state 
resources was an important source of power. The NC, who was in government during most of 
the 1990s, had control over public resources, appointments of government posts, state 
bureaucracy and policy planning and implementation, in addition to establishing clientelistic 
networks with the police (ICG 2010, 20; 2012a, 8). The government officials at the local 
level were loyal either to particular politicians or to a party (Adhikari 2012, 278). As 
elaborated upon above, the local elites of the previous Panchayat system built alliances with 
the NC to protect their interests. So did the more well-off in general (Whelpton 1994, 53). 
The NC thus largely came to be associated with a continuation of the Panchayat regime. The 
political legitimacy of the NC in relation to the local strongmen and economic elites was 
based on its ability to maintain the status quo.  
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The UML fostered similar clientelistic networks with the state bureaucracy when they came 
to power in 1994. Replacing the civil servants and government officials at the local level with 
people sympathetic to their own party has been the norm of all the parties in government, and 
has been so for the Maoists when they came to power in 2008. UML further pursued strong 
relations with the non-governmental sector, and through this, the party could influence the 
use of external development funds (ICG 2010, 20). My informant from the NC in 
Makwanpur pointed to this several times during the interview, for example stating: “Most 
funding for minority groups or other communities goes through the political parties’ 
affiliated. The money never goes directly to the minority people, it goes through the NGOs. 
The NGOs just have to give their support to in return. (Interview XII)   
 
In sum, the NC and UML to a large degree shared the interest in maintaining the elite-based 
system. Their political legitimacy and authority largely derived from their ability to 
institutionalize and protect the values, norms and interests of the high hill Hindu elite. With 
regard to the poorer sections of the society the legitimacy rested on the promises of social 
benefits such as anti-poverty programs directed toward women, children and economically 
and socially disadvantaged groups. This supports Chatterjee’s (2004) argument of the 
population in ‘political society’ as a target of policy, emphasizing the source of legitimation it 
provides for the political actors to provide welfare to these groups. Whereas they by 
constitution are ‘citizens with rights’, they tend to be seen as ‘populations that need to be 
governed’. Another dimension to this is that the popular masses also expect such informal 
patronage  (Gellner 2008, 161-166). As noted by Pfaff-Czarnecka (2004, 180):  
When people can choose between a weak leader and a corrupt leader they 
often choose the last one who can provide the needed goods and services by 
mobilizing his own patrons. (…) The clients increasingly consider themselves 
to be the legitimate recipients of goods and services provided by ‘the state’.   
 
After 2006, the sources of legitimation and authorization of the NC have rested with its 
ability to maintain the status quo. In the debates on federalism, the NC has gained broad 
legitimacy among upper castes and classes as well as the national media for representing the 
anti-federalist agenda. With their strong influence on the public debate these groups have 
become important allies for the NC in the debate on federalism (ICG 2012a, 1). This has 
largely come to be true for UML too, although, as stated above, the party has been more 
staggering on the issue of identity-based federalism. Although the NC has agreed on 
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federalization, as seen above, this was because it had little other choice, and it has suggested 
a federal model that would imply a limited alternation of power.  
 
In line with Stokke and Selboe’s (2009) argumentation, the symbolic representation should 
be understood as a political practice rather than a pre-existing given identity, i.e. something 
that is constantly negotiated because both the group and the leaders who claim the legitimacy 
of this group is based on constructed identities or interest which serve a practical purpose. In 
the pluralistic society of Nepal there is no clear majority in terms of ethnic groups, but rather 
a myriad of minorities. During the Panchayat system the King sought to assimilate the 
population through the promotion of one language (Nepali), one religion (Hinduism) and one 
culture (the culture of the high hill Hindu caste). The NC and UML have largely continued 
this approach after 1990. Although a few steps were made in the direction of acknowledging 
the multicultural society (such as formally recognizing multilingualism and 
multiculturalism), the strategy was still to downplay the importance of ethnic identities and 
strengthen the unity of Nepal. Pursuing policies that build on the previous Panchayat 
‘Nepalization’ process has assured the dominating position of the NC and the UML.  
 
The Maoists 
When the Maoists launched their insurgency in 1996 this was a strategy to raise the issue of 
socio-economic equality through another channel than what they saw as the highly corrupt 
parliamentary system. The empirical inquiry elaborated on the successful strategy of 
‘ethnicization’ of politics in the mobilization of the masses. Collective action was based on 
the local ethnic and regional organizations across the country. Decisions were often made in 
consultation with the local leaders of the front organizations, contributing to strengthening 
their legitimacy (ICG 2007, 8). The alliance was built across cultural and ethnic divides on 
the basis of their shared experiences of marginalization by the state. The construction of a 
broad social group, as the ‘oppressed nationalities and groups’, served the purpose of 
building unity across diversity. The legitimacy of the Maoist leaders was precisely in that 
they expressed popular feelings and interests relating to the marginalization and exclusion by 
the state. An ICG report notes: “They [the Maoists] are well organized; have trained and 
articulate party leaders who can communicate persuasively; retain support among very 
marginalized communities” (ICG 2007, 19). Furthermore, the party cadres out in the districts 
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lived under very simple conditions, perceived by the masses to be ‘one of the people’ (ICG 
2010, 9). This also contributed to the legitimacy of what the Maoists represented. 
 
The Maoist change of strategy, from working against the state to working within it, implied a 
shift from interest-based representation to politically based representation. This shift 
produced, as seen above, a shift in the prioritization of rights, from the focus on socio-
economic rights to prioritizing political rights. The politically based representation was not 
only through parliament but also through local governmental bodies31.  In contrast to the NC 
and UML, who mainly gained authority through patronage networks at the local level, the 
Maoists could do so from below. The establishment of various ethnic fronts during the 
insurgency had resulted in a wide presence of Maoists across the country. They could thus 
easily access the different local bodies, such as user groups and the various committees, and 
through this influence on local budgets and the use of state resources (ICG 2010). Once in 
government they filled civil servant positions with Maoist sympathizers, building important 
networks, similar to the NC and the UML (Adhikari 2012, 276). In addition to the 
parliamentary channel of representation, the Maoists also gain legitimacy through populistic 
mechanisms, such as the Maoists trade unions that conduct campaigns with broad popular 
support like an increased minimum wage (ICG 2010, 9).  
 
The Maoists have thus changed the main channel for raising the issues of the political 
community by going from interest-based struggle against the state toward a political party-
based struggle within the democratic system, while the source of legitimization and 
authorization largely remains the same: the Maoists still seek to legitimize and authorize 
themselves as the representatives of the marginalized groups. The current backsliding of the 
Maoist party indicates that they no longer enjoy the same level of legitimacy and trust among 
the population as they did prior to the Constituent Assembly election in 2008. The failure to 
draft a new constitution, as well as the accusations of the ‘eliticization’ of UCPN(M) during 
their period in government, is likely to have contributed significantly to UCPN(M)’s severe 
electoral defeat in the election for the 2nd Constituent Assembly in November 2013. The 
Maoists have been accused of not proving any better than the mainstream parties, having 
secret meetings among the top leadership in the Constituent Assembly and making top-down 
decisions, in addition to the general dismay with the increasingly extravagant lifestyles of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Due to the Maoist insurgency, the local elected bodies were dissolved in 2002. Positions in the administrative 
apparatus at the sub-national level have since then been appointed from the central level.  
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leadership. This was even raised from critical voices within the party: “Suddenly [the party 
leadership’s] lifestyles, food habits and family haughtiness have begun to look like that of the 
upper class” while “the standard of living for the thousands of revolutionary warriors is 
generally poor and miserable.” (Adhikari 2012, 274) This indicates that the leaders have not 
been equally successful in representing themselves as ‘one of the people’, or as a party that 
genuinely wants to empower the marginalized groups. The outbreak of the Madhesis from the 
Maoist movement is a case in point. The Maoists gradually lost credibility in the eyes of the 
Madhesi activists, whom increasingly came to question the commitment of the Maoists to the 
Madhesi cause (ICG 2010, 18): First, the agenda of socio-economic change appealed more to 
the lower strata in the Madhesi society and not to the more well-off landowners (Hachhethu 
2007a, 7). Second, the Maoists were seen as responsible for the lack of special quotas for the 
Madhesi population (as was provided for women, ethnic groups and Dalits) when the Interim 
Constitution was promulgated (ICG 2007, 18). Third, the fact that the Maoists’ top leadership 
came largely from the hill population contributed to Madhesi skepticism, for whom the hill 
population’s exploitation of resources and dominance in Tarai is the most fundamental issue: 
“For the Maoists, the Tarai violence was a wake up call: much of it was directed against their 
cadres, whose appearance of dominance was shattered.” (ICG 2007, 1) 
 
It is therefore safe to conclude that the source of legitimacy and authority of the Maoists is 
severely weakened. As pointed to by Stokke and Selboe (2009, 66) the power of the ideas of 
the political actors is not about how true their views and perceptions are, but to what extent 
they manage to mobilize a group of people. In the case of the Maoists, the fragmented 
content and identities have become more salient as they are in a position where they have to 
deliver on their promises and build an alternative. This may explain why they have not been 
able to foster an actual change, and thus, inclusion remains an objective yet to be attained.   
 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal 
As previously outlined, the Maoists mobilized heavily among the Madhesi population during 
the insurgency. The Madhesi movement broke out as an immediate response to the 
promulgation of the Interim Constitution and what they saw as the NC, UML and Maoist’s 
lack of recognizing and addressing the marginalization of the Madhesi population. 
Furthermore, as pointed to above, the Madhesi movement partly came into existence in 
opposition to the Maoist influence in the region, suggesting that the Maoists did not enjoy 
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strong legitimacy or authority as representatives of the Madhesi population. The source of 
legitimation and authority of MJF leaders rests with their Madhesi identity. A contributing 
factor to the strong legitimacy of MJF is that the leadership of the movement comes from the 
intermediate and backward castes. As pointed to above, caste politics is a central feature of 
Madhesi politics. Contrary to previous Madhesi activism, which largely had been led by high 
caste people, the Madhesi movement was led by the intermediate castes, primarily the 
Yadavs (Hachhethu 2007a, 10). Given the issue that the Madhesi movement prioritized, that 
is, political self-determination rights, it was more effective to build a viable political party, 
and so, MJF registered as a political party prior to the election in 2008 (ICG 2007, 20). 
 
As pointed to above, the patron-client relationships among the landowners and the landless in 
Tarai made it easy for MJF activists to mobilize electoral support. To what extent MJF enjoys 
high levels of authority and legitimacy among the lower castes is uncertain. Hatlebakk (2007, 
20) suggests that the Madhesi uprising should be seen as “a political struggle for formal 
political influence for the traditional Terai leaders, presumingly on behalf of the Madhesi 
population”. Seen in light of Stokke and Selboe’s (2009) argument regarding the actors’ 
contestation of symbolic representation, MJF seems to have been successful in constructing 
the ‘Madhesi identity’ and replacing the Maoists as the legitimate representative of the 
Madhesi population. All of the leaders of the Madhesi movement were former Maoists, but 
gained more legitimacy when appealing to the Madhesi identity than the Maoist agenda of 
socio-economic change (Hachhethu 2007a, 7). 
 
6.2 Findings 
My analysis reveals the most profound changes in the three dimensions of the framework are 
to be found, perhaps not surprisingly, in the case of the Maoists. After all, going from armed 
insurgency to parliamentary politics would necessarily invoke changes in the strategy of 
popular mobilization.  
 
My analysis has showed in the case of the NC there have not been any major changes in the 
building of political communities, nor in the rights or the channels of representation that NC 
prioritizes. The party remains ‘status quoist’. The arguments of protecting the unity and 
integrity of Nepal correspond to the protection of the interests of the high hill Hindu elite, and 
what would secure their continuing domination in the state and in the society. This largely 
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applies to UML as well. My analysis shows the content of the political community of UML is 
more fragmented than what is the case of the NC, as the party seeks to represent the interests 
of a more diverse constituency. This has further translated into greater uncertainty in terms of 
which rights to embrace and which to promote. Going from being Unitarian to becoming 
more rights-based indicates the opportunistic approach of UML.  
 
With regards to the Maoists, my analysis reveals changes in all three dimensions. These 
changes are closely related to one another. The movement began as a collective struggle 
against the state, based on the people’s shared experience of marginalization and claims for 
socio-economic equality. As the Maoists resumed electoral politics, priorities were altered. 
Party-based struggle for political rights became more important while the issues of socio-
economic change were left unaddressed.  
 
MJF entered electoral politics in 2007, mainly due to satisfaction with the Maoists, as well as 
with the NC and UML. The Madhesi identity is at the core of the political community. The 
party has not moved beyond the single-issue agenda of identity-based federalism.  
 
The analysis reveals that all parties rely on a top-down incorporative mode of inclusion of the 
popular masses. Patronage politics are central to the form and organization of all parties, but 
are also sources of legitimation and authority. While the patronage-based politics of the NC, 
UML and MJF is primarily based on richness, due to their access to resources as mentioned 
above, the party-bossism of the Maoists has taken the form of party patronage. The local 
party bosses can based on their organizational clout provide protection for their groups. Their 
source of authority thus primarily lies in the provision of protection.   
 
The research question set out at the introduction of this paper was: what have been the 
positions of the political parties in Nepal to the issue of political and social inclusion over 
time and how may this be explained? The first part of the question was treated in the 
empirical inquiry, which concluded the citizenship policies of the political parties in Nepal 
have not fostered more inclusion even though the altering conditions in the aftermath of the 
restoration of peace in 2006 provided new opportunities for practicing and further developing 
democracy. The NC and UML have remained protectionists of the Nepali identity, based on 
the culture and identity of the high hill Hindu caste. The Maoists and MJF made attempts at 
raising inclusionary demands, but the results have remained limited to political representation 
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rights. This chapter has elaborated upon the second part of the research question. Analyzing 
the political parties’ strategies in popular mobilization, and the changes over time in the 
building of political communities, type and character of rights and channels of representation 
they opt for, provides the following explanations to the lack of inclusionary policies:    
 
For the NC and UML, the changing political context in 2006 posed a challenge to their 
previous dominance and privileged position on the political arena. Their source of political 
power is largely founded in their abilities to maintain and feed their patronage networks. This 
calls for the maintenance of status quo, hence, they resist attempts at substantial 
transformation of the state and the creation of more inclusionary politics.  
 
The Maoist movement was first brought together on the basis of interests, strategy and 
ideology across ethnic and cultural divides, including the general and unifying idea that the 
struggle had to build on the interests on various specific groups before it could advance into 
more universal agendas. However, when the Maoists resumed the parliamentary system and 
took steps from opposing previous exclusionary regimes to deliver rights for various groups, 
the fragmented identities and interests within the movement became more important and 
salient. This lack of unity has led to the failure of establishing inclusionary politics. 
Furthermore, the Maoist strategy of mobilization has gained prominence over the overall aim 
of socio-economic equality. As the Maoist leadership has become increasingly dependent on 
the middlemen in the organization and mobilization, delivering on their promises to the party 
bosses in the districts seem to have taken priority over the overall ideology of the movement. 
Hence, they have not progressed on the agenda of socio-economic change.   
 
MJF had a central role in putting inclusion on the political agenda when they entered the 
electoral scene in 2007. The failure to move beyond the single-issue agenda of identity-based 
federalism contributes to the lack of more inclusionary policies. On the basis of the interests 
of the intermediate castes, the Madhesi agenda is not wholly inclusive toward the Tarai 
population, nor is it necessarily inclusive for the Madhesi community.  
 
I believe these findings together explain the lack of fostering social and political inclusion in 
Nepal. These findings are in line with what Stokke and Törnquist (2013) points to as the 
problem of attempts at transformative politics: the challenges of creating broad and strong 
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alliances. While the conservative actors resist a change, the potential game-changers have not 
proved able to move beyond the agenda of specific interests of various groups.    	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7 Concluding remarks 
What triggered this research project was the empirical observation indicating that attempts at 
political and social inclusion in Nepal have resulted in exclusion. On the basis of this 
empirical puzzle, the research project had two objectives: first, to identify the position of the 
political parties in Nepal to the issue of social and political inclusion over time, and second, 
to explain their positions in this regard.  
 
In the research project I have taken a citizenship approach to the study of political and social 
inclusion and exclusion in the democratization process in Nepal. The empirical findings 
concluded that citizenship policies in Nepal remain exclusionary. The altering structural and 
institutional conditions that opened up new spaces for further practicing and development of 
democracy in post 2006 Nepal did not result in more inclusionary policies. Demands for 
inclusion were primarily raised by the Maoists, and to some extent also by Madhesi activism, 
but they have largely fallen short of fostering political and social inclusion. The mainstream 
parties have remained exclusionary and elite-based.   
 
My analysis concludes that the lack of more inclusionary policies is due to several reasons. 
First, the traditional parties resist a change that would threaten their dominating position both 
in the political arena and in the society in general. While the unitary state is no longer a 
feasible alternative for the NC and UML, limiting the consequences of the restructuring of 
the state is. Second, when the Maoists resumed parliamentary politics it proved more difficult 
to maintain the unity of the political community. More than just mobilizing and demanding 
change, the Maoists were expected to deliver and ‘be the change’. The Maoists on their side 
came to prioritize the specific rights of the various subgroups rather than the overall aim of 
socio-economic change. As a result, the political community has become fragmented. Third, 
MJF has not moved beyond the single-issue agenda of identity-based federalism, thus failing 
to create broad social and political inclusion, both on a regional and on a national scale.   
 
This paper has pointed to challenges in the democratization process in Nepal. Citizenship 
policies largely remain exclusionary. In light of these findings – what are the prospects for 
political and social inclusion in Nepal?  
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At the point of writing this thesis, an election for a second Constituent Assembly has been 
held, in which the NC and UML came out as the two winning parties32. The NC and UML 
have until today not played the role as actors of change – paying little less than lip-service to 
the issue of inclusion of the marginalized groups suggests that they may not in the future 
either. The findings of this research, however, suggest that UML is more likely than the NC 
to play a role in fostering more inclusion, especially if challenged by more radical forces 
from the left. The Maoists, on their side, lost almost 2/3 of their seats in the second 
Constituent Assembly. Initially there was uncertainty whether the Maoists would recognize 
the loss. The fact that they did indicates that they sincerely want to play by the rules and work 
within the framework of democracy. However, this study points to important challenges the 
Maoist party would have to overcome if the party is to play a central role in transforming the 
Nepali state, primarily relating to its abilities to build stronger alliances in the political 
community. The potential for inclusion of the single-issue agenda of the MJF remains weak. 
The party also has lost much of its support, being challenged by other Madhesi-based parties. 
  
While the dilemmas and conflicts that have been analyzed in this thesis are context-specific 
to Nepal, they are not necessarily unique as challenges to democratization processes in 
socially and ethnically stratified countries in the Global South. The analytical approach of 
this study has shed light on the challenges of actors of change to build an alternative. It points 
to the importance of building broad and strong alliances in the political community. The 
study further provides insights into the political motives behind the actors’ strategies of 
popular mobilization. The findings may have a bearing on explanations to why exclusionary 
policies persist while inclusionary demands fail to translate into substantial policies also in 
other countries. One important factor in this regard seems to be the form of mobilization and 
organization. As Mouzelis (1998) points to: populations in developing countries tend to be 
incorporated into politics from the top rather than integrated from below. It may not come as 
a surprise that all the parties in Nepal rely on a top-down mode of incorporation of the 
popular masses. However, in the case of the Maosists, the form of mobilization came to gain 
prominence over the overall goal of the movement. Working within the framework of 
multiparty democracy demanded that they get votes to win elections, which again led to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The election for the second Constituent Assembly was held 19 November 2013. The NC placed first with 196 
seats, the UML second with 175 seats and UCPN(M) third with only 80 seats. Both the NC and UML increased 
their total number of seats in comparison with the election in 2008, while UCPN(M) lost almost 2/3 of their 
seats. MJF placed seventh with 10 seats, as compared to 54 in 2008. 
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focus on the specific interests of the various subgroups. Rather than transforming the state the 
Maoists adapted to the system.     
 	  	  
	  	  83	  
 
 
 
	   84	  
Bibliography 	  Adhikari,	  Aditya.	  2012.	  "Revolution	  by	  Other	  Means."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  Transition:	  From	  
People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  265-­‐286.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Anderson,	  Benedict.	  2006.	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  
of	  Nationalism.	  London:	  Verso.	  Berry,	  Jeffrey	  M.	  2002.	  "Validity	  and	  Reliability	  Issues	  in	  Elite	  Interviewing."	  PS:	  Political	  
Science	  and	  Politics	  35	  (No.	  4):679-­‐682.	  Bleie,	  Tone.	  2010.	  Forum	  Conference	  2010.	  Indigenous	  Participation	  in	  Policy-­‐making:	  Ideals,	  Realities	  and	  Possibilities.	  Indigenous	  People's	  Forum	  Conference	  2010.	  Tromsø,	  Norway.	  Accessed	  5.03.14.	  http://uit.no/Content/225150/forum_report_2010.pdf.	  Brown,	  T.	  Louise.	  1996.	  The	  Challenge	  to	  Democracy	  in	  Nepal:	  A	  Political	  History.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Bryman,	  Alan.	  2004.	  Social	  Research	  Methods.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Butenschon,	  Nils	  A.	  2000.	  "State,	  Power,	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  A	  Theoretical	  Introduction."	  In	  Citizenship	  and	  the	  state	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  
approaches	  and	  applications,	  edited	  by	  Nils	  A.	  Butenschon,	  Uri	  Davis	  and	  Manuel	  S.	  Hassassian,	  XIX,	  449	  s.	  Syracuse,	  N.Y.:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press.	  CBS.	  2012.	  National	  Population	  and	  Housing	  Census	  2011	  (National	  Report).	  Kathmandu:	  Government	  of	  Nepal.	  National	  Planning	  Commission	  Secretariat.	  Accessed	  24.03.2014.	  http://cbs.gov.np/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/11/National	  Report.pdf.	  Chatterjee,	  Partha.	  2004.	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Governed:	  Reflections	  on	  Popular	  Politics	  in	  
Most	  of	  the	  World.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press.	  Constituent	  Assembly	  Secretariat.	  2010.	  Report	  on	  the	  Suggestions	  and	  Directives	  to	  be	  Made	  by	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Committee	  on	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Protection	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  Minorities	  and	  Marginalized	  Communities.	  Kathmandu:	  Constituent	  Assembly	  Secretariat.	  Accessed	  15.09.2013.	  http://www.ccd.org.np/resources/Study	  Committee	  Report	  Minorities.pdf.	  Dahal,	  Dev	  Raj.	  2010.	  Elections	  and	  Conflict	  in	  Nepal.	  Country	  analysis.	  Kathmandu:	  Friedrich	  Ebert	  Stiftung.	  de	  Sales,	  Anne.	  2007.	  "The	  Kam	  Magar	  Country:	  Between	  Ethnic	  Claims	  and	  Maoism."	  In	  
Resistance	  and	  the	  State:	  Nepalese	  Experiences,	  edited	  by	  David	  N.	  Gellner,	  326-­‐358.	  New	  York:	  Berghahn.	  Dhungel,	  Dwarika	  N.	  2007.	  Inside	  Out:	  Political	  Parties	  of	  Nepal.	  [Kathmandu]:	  Institute	  for	  Integrated	  Development	  Studies.	  Einsiedel,	  Sebastian	  von,	  David	  M.	  Malone,	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan.	  2012.	  "Introduction."	  In	  
Nepal	  in	  Transition:	  From	  People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  1-­‐36.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  eKantipur.	  2012a.	  "Govt.	  hatching	  conspiracy	  to	  retain	  power:	  Leader	  Oli."	  eKantipur,	  07	  April	  2012.	  Accessed	  27.04.2014.	  http://www.ekantipur.com/2012/04/07/top-­‐story/govt.-­‐hatching-­‐conspiracy-­‐to-­‐retain-­‐power-­‐leader-­‐oli/351951.html.	  
	  	  85	  
eKantipur.	  2012b.	  "UML	  will	  not	  accept	  ethnic	  federalism."	  eKantipur,	  7	  August	  2012.	  Accessed	  27.04.2014.	  http://www.ekantipur.com/2012/08/07/top-­‐story/uml-­‐will-­‐not-­‐accept-­‐ethnic-­‐federalism-­‐khanal/358398.html.	  Gayer,	  Laurent,	  and	  Christophe	  Jaffrelot.	  2009.	  Armed	  Militias	  of	  South	  Asia:	  
Fundamentalists,	  Maoists	  and	  Separatists.	  London:	  Hurst.	  Gellner,	  David	  N.	  2008.	  Resistance	  and	  the	  State:	  Nepalese	  Experiences.	  New	  Delhi:	  Social	  Science	  Press.	  Gellner,	  David	  N.,	  Joanna	  Pfaff-­‐Czarnecka,	  and	  John	  Whelpton.	  1997.	  Nationalism	  and	  
Ethnicity	  in	  a	  Hindu	  Kingdom:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Culture	  in	  Contemporary	  Nepal.	  Amsterdam:	  Harwood	  Academic.	  George,	  Alexander	  L.,	  and	  Andrew	  Bennett.	  2005.	  Case	  Studies	  and	  Theory	  Development	  
in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  MIT	  Press.	  Gerring,	  John.	  2007.	  Case	  Study	  Research:	  Principles	  and	  Practices.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Government	  of	  Nepal.	  2006.	  Nepal	  Citizenship	  Act	  2063	  (2006	  A.D.).	  Accessed	  06.01.2014.	  http://www.nrn.org.np/downloads/citizenship_act_eng.pdf.	  Grugel,	  Jean.	  2002.	  Democratization:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave.	  Hachhethu,	  Krishna.	  2003.	  "Democracy	  and	  Nationalism	  Interface	  Between	  State	  and	  Ethnicity	  in	  Nepal."	  Contributions	  to	  Nepalese	  Studies	  30	  (2):217-­‐252.	  Hachhethu,	  Krishna.	  2007a.	  "Madhesi	  Nationalism	  and	  Restructuring	  the	  Nepali	  State."	  Paper	  Constitutionalism	  and	  Diversity	  in	  Nepal,	  Centre	  for	  Nepal	  and	  Asian	  Studies,	  Tribhuvan	  University,	  Kathmandu,	  22-­‐24	  August	  2007.	  Hachhethu,	  Krishna.	  2007b.	  "Nepali	  Politics:	  People-­‐Parties	  Interface."	  In	  Resistance	  and	  
the	  State:	  Nepalese	  Experiences,	  edited	  by	  David	  N.	  Gellner,	  133-­‐176.	  New	  York:	  Berghahn.	  Hachhethu,	  Krishna,	  and	  David	  N.	  Gellner.	  2008.	  "Introduction."	  In	  Local	  Democracy	  in	  
South	  Asia:	  Microprocesses	  of	  Democratization	  in	  Nepal	  and	  its	  Neighbours,	  edited	  by	  Krishna	  Hachhethu	  and	  David	  N.	  Gellner,	  13-­‐22.	  Los	  Angeles:	  Sage.	  Hangen,	  Susan	  I.	  2010.	  The	  Rise	  of	  Ethnic	  Politics	  in	  Nepal:	  Democracy	  in	  the	  Margins.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Harriss,	  John,	  Kristian	  Stokke,	  and	  Olle	  Törnquist.	  2004.	  Politicising	  Democracy:	  The	  New	  
Local	  Politics	  and	  Democratisation.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  Hatlebakk,	  Magnus.	  2007.	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Structures	  that	  may	  Explain	  the	  Recent	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  Terai	  of	  Nepal.	  Bergen,	  Norway:	  Chr.	  Michelsen	  Institute.	  Accessed	  01.05.2014.	  http://www.norway.org.np/NR/rdonlyres/0993F5660B3548A98F819167B4FD596C/72944/http___wwwcmi.pdf.	  Heater,	  Derek.	  1999.	  What	  is	  citizenship?	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  Hoftun,	  Martin,	  John	  Whelpton,	  and	  William	  Raeper.	  1999.	  People,	  Politics	  and	  Ideology:	  
Democracy	  and	  Social	  Change	  in	  Nepal.	  Kathmandu:	  Mandala	  book	  point.	  Hutt,	  Michael.	  1991.	  "Drafting	  the	  Nepal	  Constitution,	  1990."	  Asian	  Survey	  31	  (11):1020-­‐1039.	  doi:	  10.2307/2645305.	  Accessed	  1.03.14.	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645305.	  Hutt,	  Michael.	  2004a.	  Himalayan	  "People's	  War":	  Nepal's	  Maoist	  Rebellion.	  London:	  Hurst.	  Hutt,	  Michael.	  2004b.	  "Introduction:	  Monarchy,	  Democracy	  and	  Maoism	  in	  Nepal."	  In	  
Himalayan	  'People's	  War':	  Nepal's	  Maoist	  Rebellion,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  Hutt,	  1-­‐20.	  London:	  Hurst.	  
	   86	  
Hutt,	  Michael.	  1994.	  Nepal	  in	  the	  Nineties:	  Versions	  of	  the	  Past,	  Visions	  of	  the	  Future.	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  ICG.	  2012a.	  Nepal's	  Constitution	  (I):	  Evolution	  not	  Revolution.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  01.09.2013.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/233-­‐nepals-­‐constitution-­‐i-­‐evolution-­‐not-­‐revolution.pdf.	  ICG.	  2012b.	  Nepal's	  Constitution	  (II):	  The	  Expanding	  Political	  Matrix.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  01.09.2013.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/234-­‐nepals-­‐constitution-­‐ii-­‐the-­‐expanding-­‐political-­‐matrix.pdf.	  ICG.	  2008a.	  Nepal's	  Elections	  and	  Beyond.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  02.05.2014.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/149_nepal_s_election_and_beyond.pdf.	  ICG.	  2005.	  Nepal's	  Maoists:	  Their	  Aims,	  Structures	  and	  Strategy.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  01.09.2013.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/104_nepal_s_maoists_their_aims_structure_and_strategy.pdf.	  ICG.	  2008b.	  Nepal's	  New	  Political	  Landscape.	  Kathmandu/Brussels.	  Accessed	  01.05.2014.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/156_nepal_s_new_political_landscape.	  ICG.	  2010.	  Nepal's	  Political	  Rites	  of	  Passage.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  01.09.2013.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/194	  Nepals	  Political	  Rites	  of	  Passage.pdf.	  ICG.	  2007.	  Nepal's	  Torubled	  Tarai	  Region.	  Kathmandu/Brussels:	  International	  Crisis	  Group.	  Accessed	  25.03.2014.	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-­‐asia/nepal/136_nepal_s_troubled_tarai_region.pdf.	  Jayal,	  Niraja	  Gopal.	  2013.	  Citizenship	  and	  its	  Discontents:	  An	  Indian	  History.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  King,	  Gary,	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane,	  and	  Sidney	  Verba.	  1994.	  Designing	  Social	  Inquiry:	  
Scientific	  Inference	  in	  Qualitative	  Research.	  Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Kingdom	  of	  Nepal.	  1964.	  Nepal	  Citizenship	  Act.	  1964.	  Accessed	  06.01.2014.	  http://web.archive.org/web/20070928181159/http://www.nrn.org.np/nrna/pdf/citizenship_act.pdf.	  Kymlicka,	  Will.	  1995.	  Multicultural	  Citizenship:	  A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Minority	  Rights.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  Lawoti,	  Mahendra.	  2007a.	  "Contentious	  Poltics	  in	  Democratizing	  Nepal."	  In	  Contentious	  
Politics	  and	  Democratization	  in	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  Mahendra	  Lawoti,	  1-­‐36.	  Los	  Angeles,	  Calif.:	  Sage	  Publ.	  Lawoti,	  Mahendra.	  2007b.	  "Democracy,	  Domination	  and	  Exclusionary	  Constitutional-­‐Engineering	  Process	  in	  Nepal,	  1990."	  In	  Contentious	  Politics	  and	  Democratization	  
in	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  Mahendra	  Lawoti,	  48-­‐74.	  Los	  Angeles,	  Calif.:	  Sage	  Publ.	  Lawoti,	  Mahendra.	  2012.	  "Ethnic	  Poitics	  and	  the	  Building	  of	  an	  Inclusive	  State."	  In	  Nepal	  
in	  Transition:	  From	  People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  1	  online	  resource	  (412	  s.)	  :	  digital,	  PDF	  file(s).	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
	  	  87	  
Lawoti,	  Mahendra.	  2007c.	  "Political	  Exclusion	  and	  the	  Lack	  of	  Democratisation:	  Cross-­‐National	  Evaluation	  of	  Nepali	  Institutions	  using	  a	  Majoritarian–Consensus	  Framework."	  Commonwealth	  &	  Comparative	  Politics	  45	  (1):57-­‐77.	  doi:	  10.1080/14662040601135755.	  Accessed	  2014/03/24.	  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662040601135755.	  Maktabi,	  Rania.	  2000.	  "State	  Formation	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  Lebanon.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Membership	  and	  Exclusion	  in	  a	  Sectarian	  State."	  In	  Citizenship	  and	  the	  State	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East:	  Approaches	  and	  Applications,	  edited	  by	  Nils	  A.	  Butenschøn,	  Uri	  Davis	  and	  Manuel	  S.	  Hassassian,	  146-­‐178.	  Syracuse,	  N.Y.:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press.	  Mansfield,	  Edward	  D.,	  and	  Jack	  Snyder.	  2007.	  "The	  Sequencing	  "Fallacy"."	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  18	  (3):5.	  doi:	  10.1353/jod.2007.0047.	  Accessed	  05.05.2014.	  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v018/18.3mansfield.pdf.	  Marshall,	  Thomas	  Humphrey.	  2006.	  "Citizenship	  and	  Social	  Class."	  In	  The	  Welfare	  State	  
Reader,	  edited	  by	  Francis	  G.	  Castles	  and	  Christopher	  Pierson,	  30-­‐39.	  Cambridge:	  Polity.	  Original	  edition,	  1952.	  Mouzelis,	  Nicos.	  1998.	  "Modernity,	  Late	  Development	  and	  Civil	  Society."	  In	  
Democratization	  in	  the	  Third	  World:	  Concrete	  Cases	  in	  Comparative	  and	  
Theoretical	  Perspective,	  edited	  by	  Lars	  Rudebeck,	  Olle	  Törnquist	  and	  Virgilio	  Rojas,	  57-­‐82.	  Basingstoke:	  Macmillan.	  New	  Spotlight	  Nepal.	  2012.	  "Dispute	  On	  Federalism	  Capability	  Or	  Identity?	  ."	  New	  
Spotlight	  Nepal,	  18.05.2012.	  Accessed	  31.03.2014.	  http://www.spotlightnepal.com/News/Article/Dispute-­‐On-­‐Federalism-­‐Capability-­‐Or-­‐Identity-­‐.	  O'Donnell,	  Guillermo,	  and	  Philippe	  C.	  Schmitter.	  1986.	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  
Rule:	  Tentative	  Conclusions	  About	  Uncertain	  Democracies.	  Baltimore,	  Md.:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press.	  Panday,	  Devendra	  Raj.	  2012.	  "The	  Legacy	  of	  Nepal's	  Failed	  Development."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  
Transition:	  From	  People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  81-­‐99.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Pfaff-­‐Czarnecka,	  Joanna.	  2004.	  "High	  Expectations,	  Deep	  Disappointment:	  Politics,	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  Nepal	  after	  1990."	  In	  Himalayan	  'People's	  War':	  Nepal's	  Maoist	  
Rebellion,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  Hutt,	  166-­‐191.	  London:	  Hurst.	  Pitkin,	  Hanna	  Fenichel.	  1967.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Representation.	  Berkeley,	  Calif.:	  University	  of	  California.	  Seddon,	  David.	  1994.	  "Democracy	  and	  Development	  in	  Nepal."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  the	  Nineties:	  
Versions	  of	  the	  past,	  visions	  of	  the	  future,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  Hutt,	  128-­‐164.	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Sharma,	  Prayag	  Raj.	  1997.	  "Nation-­‐Building,	  Multi-­‐Ethnicity,	  and	  the	  Hindu	  State."	  In	  
Nationalism	  and	  Ethnicity	  in	  a	  Hindu	  Kingdom:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Culture	  in	  
Contemporary	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  David	  N.	  Gellner,	  Joanna	  Pfaff-­‐Czarnecka	  and	  John	  Whelpton,	  471-­‐494.	  Amsterdam:	  Harwood	  Academic.	  Sharma,	  Sudheer.	  2004.	  "The	  Maoist	  Movement:	  An	  Evolutionary	  Perspective."	  In	  
Himalayan	  'People's	  War':	  Nepal's	  Maoist	  Rebellion,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  Hutt,	  38-­‐57.	  London:	  Hurst.	  Shrestha,	  Shyam.	  2014.	  "Maoist	  Defeat	  in	  Nepal.	  The	  Price	  of	  a	  Missed	  Opportunity."	  
Economic	  &	  Political	  Weekly	  XLIX	  (NO	  4):4.	  Accessed	  1.04.2014.	  http://www.epw.in/commentary/maoist-­‐defeat-­‐nepal.html.	  
	   88	  
Slavu,	  Catinca.	  2012.	  "The	  2008	  Constituent	  Assembly	  Election."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  Transition:	  
From	  People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  232-­‐254.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Stokke,	  Kristian.	  2013.	  "Conceptualizing	  the	  Politics	  of	  Citizenship."	  PCD	  Journal	  (forthcoming):1-­‐46.	  http://www.academia.edu/6340497/Conceptualizing_the_Politics_of_Citizenship.	  Stokke,	  Kristian.	  2011.	  "Questioning	  Liberal	  Peace."	  In	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
Environment	  and	  Development	  in	  a	  Globalised	  World:	  Exploring	  the	  Frontiers:	  
Essays	  in	  honour	  of	  Nadarajah	  Shanmugaratnam,	  edited	  by	  Nadarajah	  Shanmugaratnam,	  Darley	  Jose	  Kjosavik	  and	  Pål	  Vedeld,	  321-­‐342.	  Trondheim:	  Tapir.	  Stokke,	  Kristian,	  and	  Elin	  Selboe.	  2009.	  "Symbolic	  Representation	  as	  Political	  Practice."	  In	  Rethinking	  Popular	  Representation,	  edited	  by	  Olle	  Törnquist,	  Neil	  Webster	  and	  Kristian	  Stokke,	  XIII,	  273	  s.	  :	  diagr.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  Stokke,	  Kristian,	  and	  Olle	  Törnquist.	  2013.	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Global	  South:	  The	  
Importance	  of	  Transformative	  Politics.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  Tamang,	  Seira.	  2011.	  "Exclusionary	  Processes	  and	  Constitution	  Building	  in	  Nepal."	  
International	  Journal	  on	  Minority	  and	  Group	  Rights	  18	  (3):293-­‐308.	  doi:	  doi:10.1163/157181111X583297.	  Accessed	  1.04.14	  http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/157181111x583297.	  Thapa,	  Deepak.	  2012.	  "The	  Making	  of	  the	  Maoist	  Insurgency."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  Transition:	  
From	  People's	  War	  to	  Fragile	  Peace,	  edited	  by	  Sebastian	  von	  Einsiedel,	  David	  M.	  Malone	  and	  Suman	  Pradhan,	  37-­‐57.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Thapa,	  Deepak.	  2002.	  "The	  Maobadi	  of	  Nepal."	  In	  State	  of	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  Kanak	  Mani	  Dixit	  and	  Shastri	  Ramachandaran,	  77-­‐99.	  Kathmandu:	  Himal	  Books.	  Thapa,	  Deepak,	  and	  Bandita	  Sijapati.	  2004.	  A	  Kingdom	  Under	  Siege:	  Nepal's	  Maoist	  
Insurgency,	  1996	  to	  2004.	  Kathmandu:	  Printhouse.	  The	  Comprehensive	  Peace	  Accord.	  2006.	  The	  Comprehensice	  Peace	  Accord,.	  Accessed	  14.08.2013.	  http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_061122_Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  between	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  CPN	  %28Maoist%29.pdf.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  The	  Kingdom	  of	  Nepal,	  2047.	  1990.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  The	  Kingdom	  
of	  Nepal,	  2047	  (1990).	  http://www.supremecourt.gov.np/main.php?d=lawmaterial&f=constitution.	  The	  Interim	  Constitution	  of	  Nepal,	  2063.	  2007.	  The	  Interim	  Constitution	  of	  Nepal,	  2063	  
(2007),.	  http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nepal_Interim_Constitution2007.pdf	  The	  World	  Factbook.	  2014.	  "The	  World	  Factbook."	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  Last	  Modified	  April	  14	  2014	  Accessed	  01.05.2014.	  https://http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/np.html.	  Törnquist,	  Olle.	  2013.	  Assessing	  Dynamics	  of	  Democratisation:	  Transformative	  Politics,	  
New	  Institutions,	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Indonesia.	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  Törnquist,	  Olle.	  2009.	  "Introduction:	  The	  Problem	  is	  Representation!	  Towards	  an	  Analytical	  Framework."	  In	  Rethinking	  Popular	  Representation,	  edited	  by	  Olle	  Törnquist,	  Neil	  Webster	  and	  Kristian	  Stokke,	  XIII,	  273	  s.	  :	  diagr.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  
	  	  89	  
Törnquist,	  Olle.	  2002.	  Popular	  Development	  and	  Democracy:	  Case	  Studies	  with	  Rural	  
Dimensions	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Kerala.	  Vol.	  no.	  3.	  Oslo:	  SUM.	  Törnquist,	  Olle,	  Neera	  Chandhoke,	  John	  Harriss,	  Fredrik	  Engelstad,	  and	  et	  al.	  forthcoming.	  Book	  from	  the	  project	  on	  Democracy,	  Welfare	  and	  Development:	  
Indian	  and	  Scandinavian	  Experiences.	  Törnquist,	  Olle,	  Neil	  Webster,	  and	  Kristian	  Stokke.	  2009.	  Rethinking	  Popular	  
Representation.	  New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan.	  UNDP.	  2009.	  Nepal	  Human	  Development	  Report	  2009.	  State	  Transformation	  and	  Human	  Development.	  Nepal	  Human	  Development	  Report.	  Kathmandu.	  Accessed	  26.03.2014.	  http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Nepal/Nepal_HDR_2009.pdf.	  Webster,	  Neil.	  2013.	  Oslo	  workshop.	  Importance	  of	  Representation	  in	  Processes	  of	  Democratisation.	  [Unpublished	  work].	  Conference	  paper.	  	  Whelpton,	  John.	  1994.	  "The	  General	  Elections	  of	  May	  1991."	  In	  Nepal	  in	  the	  Nineties:	  
Versions	  of	  the	  Past,	  Visions	  of	  the	  Future,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  Hutt,	  48-­‐81.	  Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Whelpton,	  John.	  1997.	  "Political	  Identity	  in	  Nepal:	  State,	  Nation,	  and	  Community."	  In	  
Nationalism	  and	  Ethnicity	  in	  a	  Hindu	  Kingdom:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Culture	  in	  
Contemporary	  Nepal,	  edited	  by	  David	  N.	  Gellner,	  Joanna	  Pfaff-­‐Czarnecka	  and	  John	  Whelpton,	  39-­‐78.	  Amsterdam:	  Harwood	  Academic.	  Young,	  Iris	  Marion.	  2011.	  Justice	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference.	  Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  
 
 
	   90	  
Appendix A: List of informants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview I Member of Committee on Fundamental Rights 
and Directive Principles in the Constituent 
Assembly 
Kathmandu 
 
Interview II NGO employee Kathmandu 
Interview III NGO employee Kathmandu 
Interview IV Journalist Kathmandu 
Interview V Government bureaucrat Kathmandu 
Interview VI Politician Nepali Congress  Kathmandu 
Interview VII Politician Unified Marxist-Leninist  Kathmandu 
Interview VIII Politician United Communist Party (Maoist)  Kathmandu 
Interview IX Politician Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, Nepal  Kathmandu 
Interview X NGO employee Makwanpur 
Interview XI Local bureaucrat  Makwanpur 
Interview XII Politician Nepali Congress Makwanpur 
Interview XII Politician Unified Marxist-Leninist  Makwanpur 
Interview XIV Politician United Communist Party (Maoist)  Makwanpur 
